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ABSTRACT:
What is power? Traditionally, power has been theorized through a lens of agents,
their intentions, and their inter-relations. In fact, theorists of late have neglected the
notion of power, abandoning it as dispensable, unable to legitimize or explain human
action beyond “who has power over whom.” My thesis extends beyond this claim by
exploring the concept of power, but relaxing the assumption that it always derives from
agents. Although agents are still actors in, and contribute to non-agentic power, the
concept is still distinct from traditional notions of power. Rejecting these traditional
notions, this thesis suggests power can be found beyond or outside of agents. In other
words, systems with complex interconnectivities contain emergent units that produce
elements of non-agentic power. Drawing from recent sociological literatures on systemic
risk and emergence, my research finds that there are four theoretical elements of nonagentic power: nonlinearity, intentionality, collectivity, and power-source. These
elements are outlined in Chapter 3. After defining the structural aspects of non-agentic
power, the thesis will explore how non-agentic power arises through emergence and
emergent units. Rejecting traditional reductionist theories, non-agentic power is highly
complex, and therefore can only be reduced to collective, emergent social properties.
Notably, non-agentic power is closely related to other terms, like complexity,
complex systems, and systemic risk. Though each term overlaps, there are crucial
differences between power, complexity and risk. These contrasts will be highlighted in
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Chapter 4. Subsequently, Chapter 5 will provide further empirical examples of
complexity, complex systems, and systemic risk within the Internet of Things; these
examples will contextualize the debate on “what is power?”, ultimately concluding that
power can indeed be non-agentic.
The objective of this debate is not to spark a philosophical quandary over how the
human condition operates – although this discussion is certainly welcomed. Instead, this
piece aims to illuminate the hidden dimensions of power, which are ever-present in
today’s globalized world.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................... ii
CHAPTER 1. AN INTRODUCTION TO POWER AND AGENTS..............................................1
CHAPTER 2. POWER, A LITERATURE ANALYSIS ...............................................................11
I.

Agentic Power........................................................................................................11
A. Nondecisions and Institutional Power .............................................................13
B. Dependency, Interconnectivity, Ability ...........................................................18

II.

Knowledge and Power ...........................................................................................23

III.

Potential .................................................................................................................26

IV.

Soft Power..............................................................................................................28

CHAPTER 3. ELEMENTS OF NON-AGENTIC POWER .........................................................32
I.

Nonlinearity ...........................................................................................................32

II.

Intentionality ..........................................................................................................36

III.

Collectivity.............................................................................................................38

IV.

Source of Power .....................................................................................................45

CHAPTER 4. DISTANT COUSINS: COMPLEXITY, POWER AND RISK .............................49

iv

I.

Complexity.............................................................................................................51

II.

Complex Systems ..................................................................................................53

III.

Systemic Risk ........................................................................................................57

IV.

Emergence..............................................................................................................60
A. Attractors..........................................................................................................65
B. Fragility ............................................................................................................68

CHAPTER 5. THE INTERNET OF THINGS: CASE STUDIES OF POWER ...........................72
I.

Complexity [Net Neutrality] .................................................................................74

II.

Complex Systems [Open Source] .........................................................................76

III.

Non-Agentic Power ...............................................................................................80
A. Introduction ......................................................................................................80
B. The Right-to-Be-Forgotten .............................................................................83

IV.

Systemic Risk [Computer Viruses] .......................................................................88

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................92
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................101

v

Chapter 1: An Introduction to Power and Agents
***
The U.S. housing bubble burst in 2008, causing a global financial crisis. Certainly
the failure of the housing market can be pinned on a multitude of interrelated factors: the
rise of housing prices, subprime lending to people that could not afford mortgages, risky
investments in mortgage assets, the securitization of mortgages then sold worldwide, and
the list goes on. In December 2008, the housing market plummeted, sending the U.S.
economy into recession; this failure could be seen as the epicenter of the global financial
crisis; the first drop in water which caused a massive ripple effect – one that would create
a tidal wave reaching global proportions.
The collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG shortly followed as
signatory consequences of the housing market failure. Particularly in the case of Lehman,
its filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 was a watershed event in the
global financial crash; Lehman’s failure can be nonlinearly connected to subprime
lending by its bankers, and the eventual crash of the housing market. Although there are
many factors involved in the financial crash, there is an irrefutable link between the
Lehman and housing market failures. This illustrates the domino effect that took place;
housing prices fell, banks became scared and suddenly stopped lending, borrowers
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defaulted on loans, causing a liquidity crisis, ultimately changing the financial decisions
of agents across the world.
And yet, as in most financial crises, there is no single actor one can identify as the
culprit. Since 2008 we have been debating: Was it caused by the investment banks that
securitized housing mortgages? Or, the rating agencies that under the umbrage of the
First Amendment rated these securities as AAA? Or, was it the fault of borrowers who
knew they could not afford loans on their houses, or the salespeople who pushed the
loans on them? Or, maybe government regulators who failed to pry into the financial
transactions? Really, it was the configuration of the network and the particular
interrelationships between the actors that ultimately led to the crisis. While there certainly
are agents who acted, no single actor can be pinpointed as the “cause” of the crisis. As
such, we are forced to make generic statements, like “Wall Street” caused it.
We have seen a plethora of consequences from banking failures caused by the
American housing market failure. From a macroeconomic perspective, the global
economic crisis started with the aforementioned reasons, and expanded into a broader and
systemic issue that affected all agents. For any agent engaged in the market, the systemic
risk of the network is inescapably fixed. The housing market crash was a mark of the
interconnectivity that included large financial institutions, rating agencies, and money
markets the world over.
There is an inherent risk to agents in terms of their interconnectivity within
complex systems. As more agents join a system, the more interconnected they become,
and thus the probability of systemic risk grows, especially after a tipping point.
Sometimes, tipping points can cause monumental outcomes. The American housing
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bubble, for example, resulted in a truly global and systemic issue. Even for those who
weren’t aware of its failure, the breadth of its power reached across seas and borders.
For example, Alexis Cohen was a 35-year-old man living in Greece working as a
sound engineer when the recession hit in 2008. Employment plunged as Greece went into
deep debt; two years later in 2010, the economy still had not recovered. The failing
market was too much for Alexis Cohen, who found himself without work. His clients,
singers and musicians, weren’t putting on concerts, since patrons couldn’t afford tickets
(Kitsantonis 2014).
When the U.S. housing market failed, it is likely Alexis Cohen did not blink an
eye in Athens. Even when Lehman Brothers failed and the Fed did not bail them out –
Alexis still didn’t think much of it. But as the systemic failure spread to Europe and to
Greece, Alexis started seeing his business decline. In due time, Alexis would be another
person struggling from a (nonlinear) connection to the U.S. housing market failure. This
interconnected nature illustrates the importance of studying non-agentic power.
***
On July 20, 2011, the activist magazine Adbusters published an article titled
“#OCCUPYWALLSTREET,” encouraging its readers to flood lower Manhattan on
September 17th in a peaceful protest. Three days later, a retired chemistry teacher named
Cindy from Long Island posted one of the first tweets with the hashtag
#OccupyWallStreet. Fast forward one month to October 2011: The Occupy movement
had spread to 82 countries, making it one of the largest social movements in the past
decade, carrying tangible economic and political impacts (Juris 2012).
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It is likely that Cindy did not know the magnitude of her tweet in September of
2011, nor did the writers for Adbusters. Rather, Cindy was just another agent in a larger
network, unknowingly adding to the collective mass of Occupy that would develop. The
power of the Occupy movement is nuanced; some of its power is embedded in the
hashtag. Jeff Jarvis, professor of journalism at City University of New York,
appropriately said, “No one owns a (Twitter) hashtag, it has no leadership, it has no
organization, it has no creed but it’s quite appropriate to the architecture of the net”
(Berkowitz 2011). The hashtag had no leadership, the Occupy movement had no
leadership, and there was no clear direction of the campaign. As such, how does one
think about the concept of power in Occupy Wall Street, if there are no leaders, no goals,
but thousands of participants?
Can we conclude that Adbusters or Cindy had power in this situation? Or, does
Twitter have power? These reflections would be categorized traditionally, in terms of
“agentic” power. But perhaps it is the network itself, the interconnected collective of
individuals, which is the locus of power in Occupy Wall Street. If so, then this requires a
very different conceptualization of power – one that has no agent, and no intentionality.
For instance, the hashtag contributed to the ‘mind’ of Occupy that would form – a
mind that consisted of a self-proclaimed “99%” of society. Occupy purposefully had no
leaders, making the control of ideas, information, and direction highly unpredictable.
After Cindy’s tweet, the web of participants would grow, globally, to an unbounded
capacity. Together, interconnected agents and the complexities of Occupy would
constitute a formation of non-agentic power.
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Financial crises and social movement reactions to them, like Occupy Wall Street,
are not the only examples of non-traditional forms of power that require new
conceptualization. Later in this thesis, the Internet will be used as a primary illustration of
non-agentic power, including an examination of online social networks. These networks
connect people in different places and time zones, bridging communication systems and
forming dense, global complexities. While the advantages of agentic relationships and
interconnections are many, there are several dangers of interconnectivity, creating
systemic risks like financial crashes, computer viruses, and environmental issues.

***
What is Power?

Power, in theoretical terms, is a universal extension of humanity; it is an
ineluctable mode in which humans exist. In political science, scholars have commonly
viewed the study of power from a perspective of “agentic” relations. Agents, defined as
actors in a relation of power, can be considered as institutions, states and non-state actors.
In these classic perspectives of power, agents are the driving forces that cause actions,
choices, and decisions for other agents. Scholars have divided power theories into
separate “faces” – traditionally, three or four of them. In an attempt to draw out the
essential characteristics of non-agentic power embedded in these faces, I will look
beyond them to discount barriers between these viewpoints. In doing so, the key
attributes of power should overlap amidst these faces.
What is non-agentic power? Are there defining elements of non-agentic power?
These are some of the main questions we will be assessing, identifying the key aspects:
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nonlinearity, intentionality, collectivity, and source. By investigating each of these terms,
we will add to our toolbox to analyze power. Although we will go into more detail on
these terms later, a description is in order on the four dimensions of non-agentic power
used in this thesis.
The first characteristic, nonlinearity, suggests that the effects of an action may not
be linearly sequential. Instead, the consequences of an action could be unintended,
meaning that two seemingly unrelated outcomes could be connected, nonlinearly. Alexis
was nonlinearly connected to the U.S. housing market failure –this nonlinearity is often
overlooked in traditional forms of power, but highly evident in non-agentic power.
Second is the aspect of intentionality. In summary, agents forfeit intentions within
non-agentic power. Since no single agent can control non-agentic power, agents therefore
do not have intentions, goals, or the ability to influence the direction of complex systems.
Whereas traditional theories of power place agents and their intentions at the center of
their analyses, non-agentic power does not rely on agents and their intentions. For
instance, Wall Street firms did not act with the intention of causing a financial crisis –
something which ultimately lead to their own decline in fortunes. While Cindy and
Adbusters did have the intention of fomenting social unrest, they certainly had no grand,
global vision of a social movement; so hardly can these agents be compared to the roles
of Martin Luther King or Mahatma Gandhi – both leaders of social movements with
ambitious visions of societal change that were consciously institutionalized in the
movement itself.
Collectivity, the third dimension, proposes that the inclusion of many agents in a
system or network may result in the formation of non-agentic power. A meeting between
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two people is clearly an agentic situation; but a movement involving millions of people,
online social networks, innovative ideas, rapid spreading communication, and
unpredictability – this collective could amount to non-agentic power. The financial crisis
could not, and would not have happened, without the collective involvement of millions
of shareholders, stakeholders, financial institutions, and investors.
Lastly, in non-agentic systems, the source of power does not come from agents
themselves. Alternatively, the source of power emanates from emergent social properties
– groups of agents, shared ideas, and collaborative information contribute to the growing
body of non-agentic power. This “power of its own” is in fact, non-agentic, making it an
untamable collective. Taking these four dimensions into consideration, we will
demonstrate how non-agentic power has been injected into the veins of global systems
and, depending on its formation, can evolve into both a steroid and disease.

Agency

A word is in order about “agency.” The term agent can be subversive in the
context of power. All human beings have the ability to act as a political agent. In addition
to people, agents can appear in other forms as well: states, companies, banks, institutions,
etc. Political agents, or actors as I will sometimes refer to them, have been examined
extensively. The other side of the coin, however, has not been reviewed nearly as much;
if political agents are everywhere, what are non-agents? More specific to this discussion
on power: is it possible to have something exercise power that is not an agent? This thesis
will attempt to answer that question with a resounding yes, suggesting that agents today
do not hold, or even seek to control, some of the largest aspects or incidents of power in
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the world. Rather, power is manifested, evolved, and controlled by what I call nonagents: systems where extremely complex conditions present unique ingredients that
produce the emergence of non-agentic power. Power, therefore, can be non-agentic.
It is important to note that agents are fixed within agentic and non-agentic forms
of power. In agentic situations, agents possess power and are the drivers of events; yet, in
non-agentic power, the interconnectivity of agents, or even the network itself, can impact
events. This is a stark variation to consider. No longer is there a limitation on the agents,
as power expands to something much greater that cannot be captured by a single matter,
entity, or word.
Non-agentic power is created by complexity and complex systems, while also
related to systemic risk. Still, each has distinct applications. Studying the human anatomy
is complex – does this relate to power? Diving headfirst into a pool is risky – but is it a
“systemic” risk? Fundamentally, it is the interaction between the three concepts that is
most pertinent. The human anatomy may be complex, but it does not relate to power, and
systemic risks must be reverberated on a large scale, not just a single actor. In nonagentic power, it is the number of agents in a system that indicates the level of
complexity. Eventually, the collective group of agents will produce conditions of nonagentic power – and if the quantity of agents gets too big, there could be a “tipping
point,” which produces a systemic risk. Such is the process and involvement of the
terminology.
This thesis will not predict when or how these tipping points will occur – this is
no attempt to answer when the next global financial crisis will be. Indeed, it is difficult to
determine when a systemic crisis will occur, for how long, and what its power will be. So
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what can be done? Admittedly the concept of power is abstract, but the arguments made
here are not simply abstractions. There is precedent – the financial crisis, Occupy Wall
Street, the Arab Spring, and even global warming – non-agentic power is a growing
entity that must be considered in a globalized era. With new complexities comes a new
concept of power. As agents continue to collectively produce and interconnect on
massive scales, the yield of power must be seen with an innovative perspective. Agents
can no longer be the seen as the creators, developers, operators, and facilitators of power–
it’s time to look beyond.
This discussion on complexity and risk has been analyzed in a related sociological
literature. With the recent Ebola outbreak, the global health system witnessed a period of
palpable systemic risk from the epidemic. This thesis will not address complexities and
risks like Ebola, since they are part of natural phenomena. Ebola was not unintentionally
created by a collective group of actors who generated non-agentic power. In fact, Ebola
would be a “risk” no matter how interconnected the world was – if one person or five
million people were infected. Surely we are at a greater risk as a result of the
interconnectivity of air travel, health care, and immigration, but this doesn’t prove that
Ebola is non-agentic power.
As such, this study will focus more specifically on instances of power where there
is a strong correlation between power, complexity and risk. Note that in the Ebola
example, power was the missing link; agents cannot have “power” in Ebola, transformed
by the collective. The illustrations of power we will examine are commonly produced by
widespread interconnections, thus revealing its complexities, and ultimately allowing us
to assess overall risk. Ebola does not fit in this study; it is not something agents can
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collectively produce. Non-agentic power should be assessed in terms of its complexity
and risk, not explained by a natural disaster or health outbreak.
To begin, we will first review a history of literature on power, contextualizing
each concept in the framework of non-agents. First by defining the foundational aspects
of traditional, agentic power, we will then compare each facet and contrast it against my
theories of non-agentic power. Here, many of the comparisons will be in comparison to
Robert Dahl’s theory of power, which has long stood as a bedrock theory of power.
Principally, my thesis does not disregard or reject the established hypotheses of Dahl, but
rather aims to introduce non-agentic power as an additional domain in power studies, and
of supreme importance in the modern age. After addressing Dahl’s theory, as well as
other established “faces” of power, the thesis will shift to non-agentic power and its four
dimensions. By outlining the four dimensions of non-agentic power in more detail, the
applications of non-agentic power in the world today will become more transparent.
Continuing our analysis of related terms to non-agentic power, we will apply
power to empirical examples in modern technology. Specifically, we will be looking at
examples within the present Internet of Things (IoT) in order to identify the nuances
between the terms of power. In this consideration, we will identify the importance of
studying non-agentic power, as interconnectivity can pose great risk and non-agentic
power to globalized systems.
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Chapter 2: Power – A Literature Analysis
***
Although my core findings are related to non-agentic power, they are constructed
on the basis of agentic theories. In this literature review, I will first outline the main
theories of agentic power. Part II will address the idea of knowledge and power, a staple
of Foucault’s work and a category that fits between agentic and non-agentic power.
Lastly, section III will introduce theories that touch on aspects of non-agentic power,
which I will relate to my work moving forward.

I. Agentic Power

In order to understand non-agentic power, we must recognize existing theories of
power – most of which are limited to agents. Robert Dahl’s theory of ‘traditional’ power
came about in the early 1950’s; many scholars like Steven Lukes in the 1970’s have since
layered Dahl’s theory by adding different “faces” of agentic power to the debate. Dahl’s
version of power is often referred to as ‘pluralist,’ ‘compulsory,’ (Barnett and Duvall
2005), and ‘realist’ power. In Dahlian power, there are two actors: A and B, in which “A
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, p. 203). Dahl is quite focused on the relations between actors;
in this sense, relations can create a web of inter-agentic connections.
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Dahl uses the example that a regular person, such as himself, cannot control the
flow of traffic at an intersection. If an ordinary person attempts to control traffic, they
will probably be ignored or perceived as irrational. This is not surprising. However, a
policeman standing in an intersection would have no problem controlling the traffic. The
policeman (actor A), in essence, can make a car (actor B) stop, go, and pull over as he
wishes. Here, in Dahl’s definition, the policeman has power over actor B.
As Dahl suggests, and I concur, there are indeed cases of simple relations between
actors. With that said, it would be ignorant to exclude other forces involved in these
power relations, i.e. non-agents. Nonetheless, Dahl’s example is essential to the
foundation of power, as it uncovers perhaps the most common origins for agentic power
studies.
In another “traditional” outline of power, Stephen White notes the importance of
specific actors, defined as “an account of the human subject or agent, usually developed
in terms of concepts such as rationality, intentionality, responsibility, mutuality, interest,
etc.” (White 1986, p. 419). Yet, there are limits to White’s illustration of the agent. Peter
Digeser says this does not clarify its difference between autonomy, which is a valid
criticism. In the context of power, agents have freedom; choice, knowledge, and
intentionality are all critical pieces of the agent. Autonomy, on the other hand, already
indicates power at least exists, if not already attained. What if an agent has no power? He
surely still has intentions, but does intentionality equal autonomy? It is important to note
the difference; agents do not always need to have power or be seeking power. Agents are
merely a player of the game of power; but, there is more than one player, and more than
one game; non-agentic power encompasses this complexity.

12

What if, however, actors in this web are not merely influenced by one another, but
something external? Perhaps the relationship between actors is not a two-way street as
Dahl describes, but rather a multi-dimensional intersection with countless lanes? Or, what
if the web of the agents, collectively, formed a power on their own? Here, we see that
agents can form non-agentic power. This describes the abstractness of non-agentic power,
depicting how nonlinear forces can control actors in a complex world. It also reveals the
formation of non-agentic powers, and how they manifest through emergence and
collectivity.
Hannah Arendt’s theories of power walk along the same lines as Dahl, though
focusing more on the relationship between power and violence. Arendt notes that
traditional carrots and sticks are important to power, but differentiates it from violence:
“one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that power always
stands in need of numbers, whereas violence…can manage without them” (1970, p. 42).
Arendt signifies a vital point: the quantity of agents in a system of power. Though
Arendt’s work On Violence emphasizes agentic power, she alludes to quantity, a key
aspect of non-agent based power. In Chapters 3 and 4 we will address the number of
agents engaged in power, and how it can alter the conditions of power that are present.

A. Nondecisions and Institutional Power

Many agent-driven theories of power revolve around an agent’s action. Bachrach
and Baratz introduce the importance of decisions and nondecisions in this context.

13

Bachrach and Baratz see a nondecision as “a decision that results in suppression or
thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision
maker” (1970, p. 44).
In applying Bachrach and Baratz’s theory of nondecisions (1962), they use an
example of pressure in an academic setting. They outline a scenario where a professor is
preparing for an upcoming faculty meeting, and wants to change a policy that has been
with the institution for a long time. Yet, the professor doesn’t bring up the topic. There
are two main explanations for the professor’s neglect to bring up the policy-change in the
meeting: First, the professor could be fearful of being viewed as disloyal to his employer
and academic institution. This brings up a theory of institutional power. It is not only his
colleagues who are influencing his decision to remain silent about the policy change, but
also the institution he works for. The principles, history, and concern of job security are
all contributing factors to the professor’s nondecision. We will return to the idea of
institutional power shortly.
Second, the professor could be thinking about his colleagues, (A actors) and his
preconceived notion that the policy recommendation would be unfavorable. In both of
these examples, the colleagues (A) are not performing an action or demanding the
professor (B) to do anything. Yet, the professor is fully overpowered by A. These are still
examples of agentic power, despite the absence of a specific, recognizable action. The
professor is expressing his nondecision to act, which is a reaction to a result of agentic
forces: the institution and his colleagues (Ibid).
Consider another example. President Obama’s decision not to invade Syria in
2013 is a ‘nondecision’ with a large impact. Although the United States did not invade
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Syria, he still made a conscious decision not to act. Yet, it is likely this decision was
made with the issue of consequences in mind. Would there be repercussions be with Iran?
Could this turn into a long-term conflict? What would this do for approval ratings? All
these thoughts factor into a potential nondecision. In fact, these types of nondecisions
unfold in all of our daily lives, where a conscious decision produces inaction; and,
whether a decision is followed by an action or nonaction, a decision is made regardless.
As displayed, Bachratz and Baratz focus on the power of actor B in relation to
actor A; this is unorthodox, as most theorists have focused mainly on actor A’s “power
over” B. So while actor B does not have power over actor A, they still can have an impact
or influence. Here I will use the example of everyday consumers. One of the most useful
data tools in marketing is Internet traffic. In short, companies want to see where their
consumers are clicking on the Internet. So, when an apparel company (actor A) puts an
advertisement out on a specific website, they see if their consumers (actor B) are clicking
on the advertisement. Perhaps, they realize after several days, there is a better website
that will attract more traffic to their company’s product. So, they decide to modify their
original decision, and move the advertisement to another location on the web. We see
here that while the consumers (B) did not purposefully impact the decision of the
company (A), they still changed the company’s behavior. Therefore, we see Bachrach
and Baratz have added a layer to Dahl’s classical power by creating a nuanced affect to
agentic relations between actors.
Choice is another essential element of Dahlian power. In an actor’s assessment of
the options he or she has, they are choosing a path. Bachrach and Baratz did separate
themselves, to an extent, from Dahl; this separation is quite important to our discussion
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on power. In agreement with Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz see power as a relationship
between A and B, where A has power over B; yet in Bachrach and Baratz’s definition,
A’s control over B is uniquely different than Dahlian realism. Bachrach and Baratz claim
power exists when “A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A” (Bachrach
and Baratz 1962, p. 948). This is in the same realm of their nondecision theory,
describing how B can influence the decision-making of A. Relations, while still the main
focus of agentic power, are slightly altered in this definition by Bachrach and Baratz. A is
no longer directly forcing B to perform a specific action, but rather setting up the
environment or context in such a way so as to achieve actor A’s desired outcome that
power in fact exists over their actions. This could lead B to a nondecision, not to act, as a
result of A’s potential power over actor B’s power(less) position.
Power is also applied to institutions, as displayed in the professor’s nondecision.
Imagine a pawn on a chessboard; its relationship between the queen, castles, and knights
is agentic. Now, introduce the player. The player becomes the agent, and the target
becomes his opponent. This is an agentic relation of power. The pieces now become part
of the system, contributing to the game itself. Yet, let’s say the player tries to move a
pawn forward three squares, an illegal move. Play cannot continue as a result of the
player’s illegal move. Here, we see the “rules” of the game impact the relationship
between the player and his opponent. This is one of many examples of agentic
institutional power.1

1

Bachrach and Baratz also refer to changing the rules of the game as the “mobilisation of bias” (1962, p.
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It must be clear that institutional power2 is a specific and stand-alone concept of
power. Institutions are still seen as actors, and thus coincide with agentic power.
Institutional power is incredibly important in terms of involving the non-agent, as the
void between the agent and institution creates space for the non-agent; a force that can
interrupt and influence agents and institutions. Reflecting back to Dahlian power, A
controls B in a linear relationship. So, if institutions can embed themselves between A
and B, this limits A’s raw power over B.
While it can be argued that President Obama did not invade Syria because of the
balance of powers and federal bureaucracy – in all reality, he could have. After all, he is
the President. The professor, on the other hand, had much less power in relation to his
institution. The professor was severely constrained by the consequences put in place by
his academic institution, and therefore influenced his decision-making process. In
reflection, Obama’s example falls more into the category of a ‘nondecision,’ and the
professor in ‘institutional power.’ Yet, both examples contain aspects of each
classification. We see that a nondecision can overlap into several realms of power, but
intuitional power is a much narrower concept, particularly in its application.
Though Arendt would frown upon the interchangeable usage of “power” and
“force” in this paper, she fittingly addresses institutions and power, saying, “all political
institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as
soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them (1970, p.140). Agentic
power, as Arendt discovers, is linked to institutional power. Institutional power cannot be
found without first recognizing the agents, our groups of agents, which make up the

2

Bachrach and Baratz allude to theories on “institutional power,” but Barnett and Duvall coin the phrase.
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institution. As the quantity of agents increases, the institution and larger system(s) begin
to exhibit qualities of non-agentic power.

B. Dependency, Interconnectivity, Ability

David Baldwin is also critical of Dahl by adding his own contribution on
dependencies, another important aspect of agentic power relations. Baldwin denounced
Dahl for his ambiguity in the context of A’s power over B. In every case of agentic
power, A has control over B in a radically different capacity, potentially involving
numerous parties and institutions. Baldwin addresses Dahl’s indistinct concept in his own
theory of dependency, which argues that actor A often becomes dependent on B’s
services and/or resources (1980). Dahl identified that power is indeed exerted from actor
A, but overlooked that A is still receives something in return from B. Baldwin
importantly distinguished that there is often a dependency factor, but it must be clarified.
Baldwin writes, “the United States may be dependent on Saudi Arabia with respect to oil,
but it is not dependent on Saudi Arabia with respect to Strategic Arms Limitations Talks”
(Baldwin 1980, p. 497). Along the same lines, actors are often seen as interdependent.
China and the United States are often seen as interdependent; yet they are not
interdependent in the fishing industry or clean water. In my focus on non-agentic power,
this correlation is exceptionally interesting; while the United States and China may be
interdependent – in economic terms, my thesis aims to target the reasons behind this
relationship. Why are they interdependent? Perhaps they are merely interconnected?
The world is truly globalized. Every place in the world is interconnected, in one
way or another; the avenues for globalization, including trade, travel, information and
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communication, are endless. We see that people in globalized systems are extremely
connected, and in many ways benefit from such high levels of interconnectivity. Take air
travel, for example. There are over half a million trans-Atlantic flights annually, using
more than a combined 8 million gallons of fuel (Centeno 2012). A person booking a
flight from New York to London may be affected by oil prices, as airline tickets and
petroleum markets are interconnected, thus possibly impacting the dates of the New
Yorker’s London vacation. These types of interconnected markets can greatly influence
human behavior.
Interconnectivity is not just limited to markets. Everything has connections,
dependencies, and consequences; each node in a network is connected to another. Often
times, the number of connections can make a system grow larger and more powerful. The
more flights there are each day, the more oil consumed, tickets purchased, and humans
traveled – not to mention increased use of public transportation, taxis, airline food,
alcohol, and emails sent during waiting periods. There are certainly patterns of behavior
and consumption in systems like air travel, but in many ways, it is unpredictable as well.
In contrast to agentic interdependencies, interconnectivity is an essential aspect of
non-agentic power. Interconnected networks link agents within complex systems; the
culmination of agents can create uncontrollable conditions of non-agentic power. So,
while China and the United States are often cited as interdependent, they are more likely
to be interconnected; in a globalized economy, it is probable each state could survive
without one another. Of course, without an economic relationship, each country would be
worse off, and certainly different trades would pose varying scenarios and outcomes.
Nevertheless, each country would rather remain interconnected, as the cost of changing
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the status quo would be too risky and unfavorable. As the global financial crisis
displayed, global economic interconnectivity is highly consequential.
There is an important differentiation to be made between interdependency and
interconnectivity. Non-agentic power contains more elements of interconnectivity, but it
is still essential to uncover how agents become interdependent. Interdependency occurs
when agents do not have options; there is a two-way street between A and B. No other
agents are in the picture. With trade, interdependency suggests each agent could not
survive without the other. Joseph Licklider, one of the founders of the computer,
introduces two interdependent agents: a fig tree, and an insect. Licklider comments that
insects pollinate fig trees, so therefore fig trees cannot reproduce without the aid and
presence of the insect. In turn, the insect gets its food and energy from the fig tree. Thus,
Licklider notes, “the tree and insect are thus heavily interdependent” (1960, p. 4).
Although a computer scientist, Licklider correctly identifies the crux of political
interdependency: survival.
Steven Lukes also rejects the foundation of Dahl’s pluralist view of power due to
its focus on agentic behavior. For Lukes, power cannot simply be confined between A
and B’s actions. Instead, there can be an external influence on A and B. Notably, the term
influence advances in this concept; A can influence B’s thinking, but B can still interpret
and perceive. As such, we look at Foucault and his theory of knowledge and perception
to see the two are inseparable (Foucault 1980). Foucault’s ideas are closer to my theories
on non-agentic power. Yet, before diving into Foucault, we will first continue with Lukes
and agentic power.
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In a relationship between A and B, B could do something that A actually wants B
to do. Think of an intern on their first day at work; we have a boss (agent A), trying to get
the most out of the intern’s (B) work. From the other angle, the intern wants to make a
good impression, and takes it upon his/herself to get coffee for the boss. The boss (A)
does not force the intern (B) to get coffee, it just happens based on agentic interests.
Therefore, the boss (A) doesn’t have complete control over the intern’s (B) actions, but is
still benefiting; the boss gets free coffee and a loyal intern.
What this does not answer is why B is acting, (why the intern is getting coffee).
Of course, we can make an educated guess based on the intern’s interests and motives.
The intentions are rather clear; the intern wants to make a good impression and secure a
job. Lukes says power exists when actor B consciously does something to benefit A –
then A has real power. So, while the boss can’t control everything his intern does, power
still holds weight. The shear fact that he has the ability to grant the intern a full-time job
is huge; by knowing the intern’s (B) intentions, the boss (A) can get the most out of his
subordinate. Note Lukes presents a shift here, as power can now be expressed through
ideas, interpretations, and intentions – not just actions. These ideas can also come in the
form of consequences, or unintended consequences as well.
Finally, more contemporary scholars like Peter Morriss have also expanded
Dahl’s agentic theory. Morriss’ argument centers on a division of power that diverges at a
nexus of knowledge. Knowledge may, in some cases, equal power for agents; however,
what if actor A does not have knowledge of his own consequences? Morriss reverts to
Lukes in this theory, and focuses on actor A. Following this thought-process, Morriss
critically defines power as the ability to perform a specific action. While this definition is
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not new, Morriss divides power into two camps, epistemic and non-epistemic power; this
division contextualizes the growth of an actor’s decision, and the domino effect it may
have. Epistempic power falls into the camp of agentic power, while non-epistemic is
closer to my form of non-agentic power.
Epistemic power overlaps with Dahl and Waltz’s (1986) pluralist theories.
Morriss’ epistemic power says actor A’s command over B is contingent on A’s
knowledge that B has the means to perform that action. In political terms, this is
incredibly applicable. Counterterrorism agencies are very concerned with direct and
imminent threats; this is a consideration of epistemic power.
Let’s say a terrorist organization is believed to be planning an attack on American
soil, and there is significant, reliable intelligence that indicates this. As such, there is no
debate on whether terrorists have the ability to carry out the attack; it would be nearly
undeniable that, without American counterterrorism intervention, the attack would be
inevitable. Here, we have laid out an example of classic epistemic power. There is
straightforward intelligence that displays the power of the actor.
However, let’s say a new set of intelligence data comes in, which suggests the
terrorist group has either acquired, or is trying to acquire, a chemical weapons mass. This
is an entirely different situation; while the threat must be taken seriously, the power of the
terrorist group is much more fluid, and non-epistemic. Non-epistemic power focuses on
the potential for an action to be completed, but does not require concrete knowledge that
the action will occur. We don’t know how, if, or when the attack will happen. I will be
discussing Morriss’ theory of non-epistemic power more in my exploration of nonagentic power.
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II. Knowledge and Power

Foucault saw power and knowledge as an intertwined entity; there is no power
without knowledge, and knowledge does not exist without power. This is not a cause and
effect relationship, where knowledge equals power, but rather two separate maxims that
are intimately connected. Power and knowledge are important concepts for all the
theorists I have discussed. For Dahl, the policeman (A) and driver (B) were both
knowledgeable of A’s power. In turn, Lukes still saw power despite B’s knowledge of
A’s authority. These are distinct differences that are important to consider. Even so,
Foucault saw power imbedded in knowledge: “Power and knowledge directly imply one
another…there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time
power relations” (Foucault, 1977, p. 27). In this explanation, the direct implication of
power with knowledge provides an insight into Foucauldian power, which is completely
totalizing. Totalizing, Foucault believed, because it is an all-encompassing power that
brings together everything beneath it. This type of perspective is what I will be
continuing in my non-agentic power analysis.
Contrary to the cliché, power is never in anyone’s hands, which Foucault makes
explicitly clear (Digeser 1992). Power, in non-agentic terms, cannot be held, controlled,
or even expressed; without agentic ownership, power can only be experienced and lived.
Yet, in non-agentic power, knowledge is ambiguous, posing the question, who has
knowledge? Can agents in non-agentic power have knowledge? Does power itself contain

23

knowledge? These are the questions that make knowledge and power a different camp on
its own, which we can explore in the tome of Foucault’s literature.
In Digeser’s analysis of Foulcauldian power, he addresses the idea of
intentionality. For liberals, intentionality is an appendage of power, and without
intentions, power is not real. This notion becomes increasingly blurred in Foucault’s
theory of power, which focuses not on the intentions of A or B, but rather the unintended
consequences of their actions. Foucault writes that a study of power should not be
concerned with “the level of conscious intention of decision;…it should not attempt to
consider power from its internal point of view” (1980, p. 97).
I must agree with Foucault, who argues there is no all-encompassing ‘theory’ of
power. Rather, power is a set of intricacies that man exists with, and who is entertained
by the ideas it implores.
Foucault also theorized that in order for agentic relations to even exist, there are
several foundational requirements that first must be present (Foucault 1982). First, there
must be systems of differentiation. Agents cannot be in a relation of power, unless there
are innate differences between them. Differences that Foucault discusses are related to
prefixed contrasts, like economic values, social class, or cultural status. There can also be
differences in objectives between agents. Objectives, plainly, are quite similar to
competition; for someone like Hobbes, agents are naturally competitive and aggressive in
the state of nature, only to be freed by the powerful Leviathan (Hobbes 1651). Similarly,
Foucault marks objectives as an origin of agentic relations, but does not require an
additional power, like a state, to subjugate the rights of agents.
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Furthermore, Foucault uses examples of technology and military force as factors
of competition. In order for agents to exist under the same system, there must be factors
in which they communicate between, or interact within. Along the same lines, there must
be a common institutionalization factor for the actors to amalgamate into, and finally, a
consideration of degrees of rationalization. In this sense, Foucault questions the
pragmatism of the agents’ objectives, and the accessibility of external mechanisms to
achieve those goals (Foucault 1982).
In this way, Foucault accepts a somewhat daunting division of power. If we
simply accept that, considering these foundations of agentic relations, agents will indeed
compete for power, it seems there will ensue an endless cyclicality. First, agents are
introduced to power, then to other agent(s), and finally to their own desires. It is a simple
formula that has created endless war and destruction. Yet Foucault brings in the
sovereign to conceptualize the politicization of power. Sovereignty, “encompasses the
totality of the social body” in the sense that a sovereign state embodies all citizens and
their properties (Ibid, p. 104). Power, then, can be described as a relationship between the
sovereign and the agent; the sovereign eliminates agentic relations, by ridding the
quarrelsome formula recently mentioned. Yet, Foucault admits true sovereignty is more
of a theory of the feudal monarchy, and only glimpses of real sovereignty have appeared
since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Ibid). What is left in today’s political
realm is what Foucault calls discipline, the profound antithesis of the sovereign, which
has been established in the wake of capital and labor.
State power has transformed from a sovereign figure to a control mechanism.
Discipline has molded agentic behavior that exists beneath this power. To better
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understand Foucault’s theory of discipline, we see features include societal rules, like
posture and manners, and invasions of privacy like surveillance. The surveillance state
has become the extensive reach of disciplinary power; it is, present day, inescapable, as
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has described (Assange 2014). Society is no longer
sovereign, as the surveillance state has disciplined the behavior of its own citizens.
Citizens of the surveillance state are reactionary to it, and are therefore molded by its
presence. Where “the theory of the sovereignty permits the foundation of an absolute
power in the absolute expenditure of power” (1980, p. 106), the theory of discipline
limits the power of its people, while augmenting the power of its reach. Foucault
concludes, “these two limits, a right of sovereignty and a mechanism of discipline, which
I define, I believe, the arena in which power is exercised. But these two limits are so
heterogeneous that they cannot possibly be reduced to each other” (Ibid).
Foucault’s theories of discipline and sovereignty are at the cross-section of
agentic and non-agentic power. And, the sovereign also cannot limit non-agentic power,
as it is limitless by definition. In many ways, non-agentic power contains elements of
discipline. But both sovereignty and discipline influence agentic behavior within the
system. We will move onto addressing the intricacies of non-agentic power, keeping
Foucault’s theories in mind.

III. Potential

As we descend into the world of non-agents, it is important to keep in mind we
are no longer focusing on actors A and B, but rather the collective or system that A and B
contributes toward. I earlier referenced Morriss’ non-epistemic power in an example of
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the terrorist organization. Morriss’ non-epistemic power is much more interesting in our
study compared to his epistemic analysis. Non-epistemic power focuses on an actor’s
potential to commit an action, rather than the actor’s current ability; this theory
decentralizes from the actor, and views power from a perspective of non-agency. I will
give another example. While Apple has not created the next major technology after the
iPhone and iPod, many people realize they have the potential to create and manufacture
this technology. Therefore, Apple’s competitors, consumers, and employees all factor this
idea into their notion of Apple’s overall power as a company. Although Apple hasn’t
even made this, let’s say – “revolutionary” product, their potential to do so still factors
into their power. Here, Morriss has introduced a non-agentic form of power: potential.3
Morriss adds another layer to his multifaceted theories, which he refers to as
“latent.” Notably, Bachrach and Baratz also use the term of latency to describe the
mobilization of bias and nondecisions. As mentioned, Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of
nondecision was analogous to inaction; for Morriss, this type of inaction is a problem.
Since Morriss’ power is contingent on calculated action, or potential for action, a
nondecision impedes the relationship.
Latent abilities, for Morriss, extend beyond Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of
latency and focuses more on potential. The ability to code is an example of a latent
ability. Computer coding is not a natural ability like walking or running, but rather a
learned skill. As such, latency is concerned with an ability that is not currently present,
but possible to obtain. In non-epistemic terms, imagine a web developer working on a
project for a tech startup. This web developer already has knowledge of computer coding,
3

Note: I am not arguing that Apple has explicit “non-agentic” power because the company has the means
and ability to create a certain product. Rather, I am identifying one contributing characteristic of nonagentic power – for a single agent – as latent ability.
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but does not have web-marketing skills. In this example, the developer has some agentic
power, but is limited by his/her lack of marketing knowledge. Still, the developer has
latent power, as the tech startup could provide resources for him to learn marketing
skills.
Scholars of late have also rejected Dahl’s version of power for its finite analysis
of agentic power. Notably, Parietti (2013) scrutinized Dahl, and his predecessor, Weber
(1947), for their linguistic simplicities. Parietti recognizes that Dahl’s theory is circular
for its language that A “can” get B to do something. Yet, this often doesn’t tell us what
“can” is. Dahl’s explanation tells us more about A’s capabilities than the concept of
power itself. This, in turn, poses the question of potential, which Morriss addresses, but
Dahl does not explore. The circularity, then, is born within the concept of power itself,
where “power represents, not a thing but, a condition under which things may be thought
and done (Parietti 2015, p. 14). Applauding Parietti, this critique of Dahl perceives power
close to Foucaldian discipline, but reaching further past agents. Parietti does not
explicitly address the presence non-agentic power, but neither denies it.

IV. Soft Power

Soft power is closely linked to non-agentic power; both types of power are
concerned with abstract influence. That is, are agents unconsciously influenced by
‘greater’ powers? In soft power however, agents do not contribute to power; this contrasts
with non-agentic power, which acknowledges the contributions of agents in complex
systems. Soft power is not, as Joseph Nye (2011) stresses, the culmination of everything
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other-than hard power and its realist carrots and sticks. Dahlian power, in this context, is
focused directly on hard power.
There are always undertones of soft power within hard power situations. Instead
of using force, one can simply try to change another’s preferences. In this sense, the
target B is not forced to do something by A, but chooses on his/her own accord.
Moreover, intentions are once again important. Nye notes that media and propaganda
often vibrate aspects of soft power, but we see varying intentionality. For example, Voice
of America is different than Hollywood in their intentions. Voice of America is
intentionally trying to win the heart and minds of people in authoritarian countries in
order to undermine the regime, but Hollywood’s sole intention is profit. Even so,
together, the ultimate results of ‘soft power’ may be the same.
It is essential here to mark the differences between the popular term of soft power,
and its close cousin, non-agentic power. The United States uses soft power in aid
situations frequently, and other countries have joined. For example, in 2010 the
earthquake in Haiti was followed by a massive relief effort from countries like Brazil and
China. Many argue the two countries only sent military troops as a façade – a merely
ostensible aid mission. Soft power often, but not always, utilizes ideas and public
conceptions in order to influence another actor – a state, government, person, etc. As the
2007 Beijing Olympics approached, Steven Spielberg sent a letter to President Hu Jintao,
asking China to use its global influence during the Olympics to push Sudan to accept a
UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Soon after, China sent a representative to Darfur who
successfully negotiated a deal; despite years of diplomatic attempts, it took an open letter
from an American movie director to push on China’s influence. Then, just months later,
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Beijing’s opening ceremonies of the 2007 Olympics flaunted soft power; billions around
the world witnessed the beauty, drama, and sheer magnitude of the ceremony, all
intertwined with a spark of Chinese history, culture, and (soft) power.
Soft power is not contradictory to realism, nor a form of liberalism, or an artifact
of idealism (Nye 2011, p. 82). Instead, soft power is an encompassing technique of power
security that exists in states, corporations, institutions, NGO’s, terrorist networks and
more. Notably, agents are not as central and focalized as they are in non-agentic power.
Even so, there are some clear areas of overlap between the two concepts. Nye uses
Lukes’ three ‘faces’ of power in order to contextualize soft power; he also labels actor A
as the “agent,” and actor B as the “target.” In a situation where soft power is exercised,
the target matters just as much as the agent. In this conversation, target B can potentially
control, coerce, or influence the decision of agent A (Lukes 2007).4
Now B has relative power. Lukes sees this potential as well, where B can impact
A’s interests. In reference to Lukes’ (2007) writing, Nye notes, “Although not always
easy, we can distinguish indoctrination from free choice in most instances” (Nye 2011, p.
87). So, while two agents are rational actors and think freely, their decisions are not
independent of one another; in a connected society, one decision never stands alone. This
causality creates space between actors to rationally act, but also influence each other. As
such, ‘free choice’ becomes an absence filled by the influence of B on A. Barnett and
Duvall, who specify this type of power as “productive,” express this type of mental
influence in more detail.
“Productive power” is Barnett and Duvall’s most abstract and discursive theory
of power. Productive power “concerns discourse, the social processes and the systems of
4

We saw this slight role-reversal expressed earlier by Bachrach and Baratz.
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knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and
transformed” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 55). Here, power is shifted into a construct of
society. Terms like “civilized,” “Western,” and “failed state” are all examples of socially
constructed effects of power relations. In one application, there are no concrete ways to
measure a failed state; rather, a failed state is an expression of power that is produced and
experienced by contemporary society.
In addition to “productive power” I want to touch on IR theorists Duvall and
Barnett’s “structural power,” which is the “the constitution of subjects’ capacities in
direct structural relation to one another” (2005, p. 43). In essence, A is only related to B
because of the system, institution, or political structure they interact within. For example,
Duvall and Barnett use the terms Master-Slave and Capital-Labor as an illustration of
systemic relations. Without the system of slavery, a master wouldn’t have power over his
slave. The mentalities of slaves believing they are inferior to their masters, and the
masters more powerful, could be exaggerated by the system. In turn, without the social
implications of capitalism, capital would be obsolete. Note here that power dynamics
evolving from the “structural power” category are outcomes of non-agentic systems.
Whilst (A and B) agents still exist, the driving force between their relative powers no
longer comes from actors themselves – but the entities which agents produce.
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Chapter 3: Elements of Non-Agentic Power
***
In Chapter 2 we examined the history of agentic and non-agentic power, covering
numerous theories of power that lay in each camp. While existing theories on power are
crucial, there are still several questions that remain in terms of what constitutes nonagentic power. As such, Chapter 3 will continue to explore theories on power, but will
offer new insight to the study of non-agentic power.
In this chapter, I will outline four specific elements of non-agentic power:
nonlinearity, intentionality, collectivity, and source. In addition to describing the 4
elements of non-agentic power, I will compare and contrast each characteristic to agentic
power, using examples to put each dimension in context.

I. Nonlinearity

The first element of non-agentic power is that it is nonlinear. First, let’s remind
ourselves of agentic power in the frame of linearity. In Dahlian power, we see agents A
and B exist on a linear plane. Spatially, A and B are connected by their relationship of
power, which can be expressed in a linear sequence: AàB, or BàA. This model extends
beyond Dahl to other agentic theories of power as well. In institutional power, we see the
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model looking something like this: AàINSTàB. This relationship is agentic and linear,
with the institution acting as an intermediary between actors A and B. The primary
difference from Dahlian power is that the institution creates distance between A and B,
possibly resulting in a greater time-gap between an action and its consequence. Looking
at Bachrach and Baratz’s theories of nondecisions and dependency, agents A and B still
act in a sequence of linearity as well. In the infrequent yet possible situation that actor B
benefits from A’s inaction, Bachrach and Baratz call this situation a nondecision. We see
the system has not radically changed as a result of B benefiting from A, or vice versa. If
A’s power becomes dependent on B’s services, this once again does not interfere with the
linearity of the relationship, or the function of the system.
In short, linearity does not change the larger picture of power. AàB and BàA
effects a single relationship between two actors. Indeed, with the notion of unintended
consequences, a simple, calculated action of power expressed by actor A on B can have
implications for C and D. This ripple effect is certainly real and worth considering while
evaluating the consequences, intended or not, of an actor’s action. As such, we see that
even these types of consequence-based scenarios are agentic, linear relationships:
AàB[àCàD]. Even after the action of A is over, the consequences can be calculated
on a basis of linear relationships. One consequence can have cascading effects on
multiple actors. In doing so, the amount of power dispersed from A’s specific action can
be linearly measured. We can call this backtracking.
For example, let’s say agent D is a young boy. One day, the boy comes home for
dinner and there is no food. As an analysis, we find out that the boy’s mother, agent C,
was recently fired from her job and cannot afford food. This is because the woman’s
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boss, (agent B) was under pressure by the corporate headquarters (agent A) to let
employees go due to the poor quarterly results. Although the headquarters and the boy
(agents A and D) never interact, the boy is still affected by the actions of actors A, B, and
C who precede him in the linear sequence.
In contrast to agentic power, non-agentic power is nonlinear. Agents within nonagentic power are tightly connected within the sequence of intertwined cascading events.
Using the example we just looked at, there are two main problems that are connected.
First, the company is failing, which is the reason the woman got fired. Second, the young
boy has no food to eat. These two issues are undoubtedly connected, but they are not
linearly connected. In the figure below, we see that the non-agentic force connects A and
D, which represents the failing company and the boy with no dinner.

As visually depicted, the non-agentic force completely disrupts the linearity of the
agentic sequence, but offers a link – an abstract explanation for the two problems.
Although the linear sequence still exists, the non-agentic force provides insight as to why
the company may be failing, and how it is connected to the boy. Note here that A, B, C,
and D all exist within the same system, all acting as singular, connected nodes. We can
also see it is difficult to identify the source of power, another separate element of nonagentic power that I outline in this chapter.
Let’s say the company’s stock had plummeted in recent weeks due to a variety of
reasons. Stockholders have the power to make a personal decision whether to sell their
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stock or not; in many ways, this is a non-agentic situation in itself. When individuals buy
and sell shares in a company, there is an agentic relationship between the individual (A)
and the company headquarters (B). Yet, when hundreds or thousands of people engage in
the same activity of buying and selling, the shareholders as a group dictate how the stock
shifts, and how the company reacts. This is the control of non-agentic power. This
contributes to the concept of emergence, which we will return to.
Admittedly, there are also major components of each actor’s intentions in this
example. What are the intentions of the stockholders? What are the intentions of the
headquarters that conceivably understands the possible impacts of firing employees? We
will return to this idea as well in next section, which discusses the second element of nonagentic power, intentionality.
Interconnectivity between agents is nonlinear and complex in a non-agentic
situation. While the failing company resulted in a high-ranking affiliate firing the young
boy’s mother, perhaps it was actually a media outlet that recommended selling stock in
that company. Therefore, all share sellers who were influenced by the media are
connected, non-linearly, to the young boy that has no food. Additionally, there can be
something of a “herd mentality” that occurs. For instance, perhaps shareholders sold
stock in the company because the market shifts in a certain direction; as agents see this
change, there can be a rush to sell before others do, potentially creating a crash or crisis
where all actors are worse off. We see this turning into somewhat of a prisoner’s dilemma
among shareholders.
So, there can be a variety of reasons that result in the same outcome for
stockholders, the company headquarters, the affiliate/boss, the mother, and the boy. There

35

is no linear sequence between the actors that can be tracked; there are no rational
explanations for how each agent acts. The reasons for outcomes derive from non-agentic
power, which cannot be controlled, i.e. nobody can control the “herd” mentality. Agents
can try and control the herd, like a farmer herding his sheep – but, in the end, the herd
acts in unpredictable ways. And if one sheep wants to go east, but the rest want to go
west, the herd will likely influence the lone-sheep to also go east, thus creating the herd
mentality.

II. Intentionality
The second element of non-agentic power is intentionality. For non-agents, or
actors existing in non-agentic complexes, there are absences of intentions. In order to
explain this thoroughly, I first suggest that intentions exist in an agent-agent relationship.
In an agentic relationship, agents are conscious of their actions, and their action’s
potential outcome. Actor A is conscious of his actions in the example AàB. There can
still be unintended consequences of A’s action, which he may be unaware of, but there is
nonetheless a fundamental intention of the actor.
Let’s return back to the example with the failing company and the boy with no
food. As mentioned, there is an agentic relationship between stockholders and the
company they invest in. When people invest in stock, their intentions are clear – to make
a profit. Here, we see an example of a simple, agentic relationship between a buyer and a
company. Intentionality is an essential example of agentic power, whereas there is no
intentionality in non-agentic power.
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Non-agentic intentionality embodies on the collective. When many people act in
the same way, without analogous intentions, the linearity is broken; thus, there is a lack
of intentionality for agents in non-agentic power. For example, Cindy did not have the
intention to create Occupy Wall Street – she just contributed to it. I do not have the
intention of creating a revolution in academia based on these theories of non-agentic
power – although perhaps it is possible? I can only hope. In essence, agents do not always
comprehend the full consequences of their actions within non-agentic power, and
therefore lack intentionality.
Furthermore, stockholders do not have intention to undermine a company when
selling their stocks. Stockholders are not purposefully forcing the mother out of work,
and they are not purposefully making the boy hungry. Rather, stockholders are
performing a simple, agentic action by selling shares. Perhaps, instead, they found a
better investment elsewhere, oil plummeted, or the bond market became more attractive
than stocks in general; as a result of these factors, and many other possibilities, the
agentic relationship between the stockholder and company is broken. A single agent’s
decision to sell, let’s say because oil plummeted, is not a radical shift; this does not affect
the “big picture” like we discussed earlier. Yet, if oil prices plummet enough, the herd
mentality could start to take effect. When this happens, and the collective group becomes
larger and more cohesive, a formidable non-agentic power can start to form. When large
trends in the market manifest, there are no longer intentions – the force cannot be
controlled by an agent’s intentions, nor does it have intentions on its own accord. I will
continue this explanation of the collective – the third element of non-agentic power – in
the next section of this chapter.
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To recap, while agents themselves have intentions, like when investing, but nonagents do not. One of the main reasons behind the lack of intentionality is that there is
depth to a non-agentic force. Intentions are key factors in non-agentic power; it is an
element of its structure. On the other hand, we have yet to address the formation of nonagentic power, and how its structure builds. Why are there no intentions? Where does this
begin? The answer starts with collectivity. As the number of agents involved increases,
its interconnected nodes begin to form a larger power, separate from the agents
themselves. With each additional agent, the network grows, adding to the collective unit,
and growing alongside the breadth of non-agentic power.

III. Collectivity

The third element of non-agentic power is collectivity. The importance of the
collective is essential in consideration of non-agentic power, as it combines the abilities
and actions of all agents. The collection of a handful of agents is still considered agentic
power; it is the multiplicity and growth of a network that produces elements of nonagentic power. To reiterate, there is no clear line where an agentic power turns nonagentic. Instead, there are elements of agentic and non-agentic power that we can
analyze, perhaps ultimately deducing that a power has more non-agentic qualities based
on a series of characteristics that I have, and will continue to outline.
The collection of agents in a single network commonly gives agentic powers nonagentic attributes. This occurs when the collection of agents builds a power of its own.
We can once again use the Internet to show that it is easy for agents to communicate on
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the Internet. This is nothing new or unexplained; when the collective is introduced
however, this is when non-agentic power can be highly influential.
As Juris (2012) points out, technology-influenced social movements in the 1990’s
mainly used listserv accounts and mailing lists. Yet the introduction of social media
completely changed the game. In fact, the biggest change from 1990’s email lists
compared to modern social media movements is the size of each actor’s network.
The dyadic link between listservs and emails compared to social networks reveals
the power of agents within each system. Emails are a mode of communication between
agents; while one agent can send an email to a million people or to a large listserv, each
actor acts as a “gatekeeper” where they have the power to decide whether to “forward”
the email or not. In this sense, each actor that receives the email is empowered, while the
power of the original sender is diminished.
In diffuse networks, like social media, there are no gatekeepers. Information flows
at will. All actors suddenly become connected, through an open gate with no gatekeeper –
the mutual friend, mutual connections, and shared interest groups. Without gatekeepers or
agents to control the spread of information, the collective non-agentic power can grow
quickly and unchallenged; this has been displayed first hand through the rise of open
source information on the Internet. We will return to open source in Chapter 5 in our
discussion of complex systems, like the Internet, using Wikipedia as an example.
Network is a common term used today, particularly in the realm of social media.
Before the 21st century, a social ‘network’ might have been defined as a friend or social
group. Work colleagues, childhood friends, admired authors, and trusted mentors – these
are all different classifications of ‘groups’ or ‘networks’ one might have referred to. Yet
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the term network has morphed into an entire different entity. Agentic relations no longer
define networks; I no longer have to know the people in my ‘network,’ as the term has
fewer boundaries today.
Network has also turned into a gerund: networking. In colleges and universities
across the country, classes and tutorials are taught on the “best networking practices,”
and “how to” properly network. We now see people profiting from teaching others how
to improve their networking skills, despite the fact that ‘network’ is such an expansive
term. Today, the term networking logic describes the frame of mind that people use while
actively networking. “Networking logics thus involve more than a disposition toward
building horizontal connections across diversity and difference; they also help other
political actors interpret such practices” (Juris 2012, p. 266). In essence, networking logic
is radically different than agent-based networking. Online networks are so extensive they
are nonlinear (the second element of non-agentic power).
As Juris mentions, networking has shifted from horizontal connection-making,
and has advanced to a more fluid, disorganized, diffused system of interrelated people,
ideas, and agents; indeed, agents are the central players of networks, and therefore we are
not resisting the idea of agentic relations, or throwing agents out the window. Rather, we
are exploring how networks grow into non-agentic power through collective agentic
relations.
Networks are part of nearly everyone’s lives, including mine. LinkedIn has
become the largest hub for networking, as agents connect with each other to provide a
platform of introductions and network connections. I have no doubt that LinkedIn has
benefited many people in job searches and career advisement – that is why I have a
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LinkedIn profile. But the networking aspect is a bit exaggerated. For example, the image
below displays my own network on LinkedIn:

According to LinkedIn, my 241 connections gives me access to over 4.5 million
people in my network. For sure I don’t know 4.5 million people, let alone consider them
part of my network. One could argue that I have 241 agentic relationships, giving me
some type of neo-Dahlian agentic power; in turn, one could also say I am a small pawn in
a much larger, non-agentic system with great power. If all of my 241 connections have a
network with over a million people, we see a colossal network unfolding—an
interconnected mammoth, despite there being a very low amount of concrete, agentic
relationships. We see that networks are simply a pile of agents, layered on top of each
other, somehow connected by an unknown thread.
Juris uses the term “logic of aggregation” to describe “the assembling of masses
of individuals from diverse backgrounds within physical spaces” (2012, p. 260). The
physical space that Juris references the ‘network’ – today, an overwhelming amount of
Western society engages in social media networks. Furthermore, online social networks
are completely detached and unbiased toward socioeconomic, political, religious, and
ethnic backgrounds. These attributes of networks make it increasingly easy to join and
leave networks effortlessly. It only takes one click to join a ‘group’ on Facebook or
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LinkedIn. This is opposed to an agentic network, where it can be much harder to break
socially constructed boundaries in the workplace or social cliques.
There is a sizable peril associated with the accessibility for actors to join networks
so freely. As described in Chapter 2, Foucault believes the surveillance state is an
extension of disciplinary power. This could be, perhaps, where power originates from – I
will examine the notion in the next and final section of this chapter, where I discuss the
“source” of power. Yet there is an applicable relationship between surveillance and
networks; by making networks open and diffuse, we are opening society up to a new era
of information control. This has already been displayed with controversies over NSA
surveillance, net neutrality, and cyber security. By joining collective, open, and public
networks, we give way to larger insecurities, otherwise unexposed to in more agentic or
insular networks.
Additionally, there is a facet of inter-linkage within the concept of collectivity.
How related, if at all, are different networks of non-agentic power? If the collective forms
non-agentic power, can this have “unintended consequences” like we explored in an
agentic situation? Markets are often referred to as “interlinked.” The real estate market
may be linked to the bond market or the gold market or the stock market; one cannot
predict how each will act in response to one another, but there are certainly links between
the ebbs and flows of each. Examples are all around; the natural gas and petroleum
markets are completely different markets, but undoubtedly interconnected; as fracking
increases, gas prices could potentially fall, which could also have effects on other energy
markets like coal, solar energy, etc.
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This level of interconnectivity could be detrimental. As non-agentic power grows,
collects, and connects – societies become more vulnerable. The financial crisis in 2008
displayed the non-agentic power of the global economy; as the U.S. housing market
failed and the economy went into recession, many Americans stopped consuming (at
least at a steady rate). As a result, American companies slowed imports from China, thus
impacting the Chinese market. The global economy is so interconnected – one failure
could possibly bring the entire system down. The conventional actor, and his agentic
relations, is left detached and exposed.
The aggregation aspect that Juris notes is an important piece as well. In order to
build this massive, non-agentic network that I have described, aggregation is essential.
For example, if this was 2003 and I was part of the first wave of LinkedIn users, it’s
likely my ‘network’ would be much smaller. In short, in order to have such a large
network, and in order for the network to have non-agentic power, people must join. No
social movement gains any power without public endorsement and cooperation.
Let’s consider the use of social media during the Occupy movement in 2011. The
case of the Occupy Wall Street and Occupy Everywhere is an interesting case, as the
social movement purposefully had no leaders, making it a compelling example of nonagentic power. This analysis of the Occupy movement is not to address its successes and
failures. Instead, the Occupy movement exhibited numerous elements of non-agentic
power that are worth discussing.
As with the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement launched with assistance and rise
of Twitter and Facebook. In the introduction we mentioned that a woman named Cindy
was one of the first people to tweet about the Occupy movement. In fact, the Occupy
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movement wouldn’t have existed without millions of people like Cindy participating
online and joining the ‘social network’ of Occupy. For the first time, an agent could
participate in a social movement from his couch or desk at work. Ironically, one of the
‘founders’ of the Occupy movement, Micah White, coined and critiqued “clicktivism,”
the new age of technologically-based activism online; clicktivism measures successful
protest campaigns solely on the number of ‘clicks’ or electronic signatures it receives
(White 2010). There is irony here, since Occupy likely wouldn’t have been the same
without so many agents ‘clicking’ in.
Non-agentic networks rely on collectivity and aggregation; without these
elements, a network is just another sum of agentic connections, not a growing nonagentic powerhouse. Since there was an absence of purpose, goals and direction in
Occupy, we can view this as a unique case for non-agentic power. Letting the collectivity
of people and aggregation of ideas dictate the direction of a movement is seldom seen.
Although to an outsider it may seem chaotic and disorganized, non-agentic power like the
Occupy movement is tactically immeasurable; there are no transparent ‘prices,’ ‘clicks,’
or benchmarks, making growth difficult to track.
In fact, many social movements in the past have used this same framework. While
Martin Luther King Jr. was certainly the leader of the civil rights movement in the U.S.,
many scholars believe that segregation would have ended even without MLK. Though
segregation would not have ended at the time it did without MLK – he’s arguably the
most influential activist in American history; the collection of the movement was
undeniably there. Lastly, the civil rights movement is also an example of how the
electricity of one agent, like MLK, can incite millions of others within his/her network.
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When the electricity travels so quickly and powerfully, the non-agentic force of a
movement can be difficult to stop.

IV. Source of Power

Where does power come from? The question begins the paramount debate of this
thesis, as it begs the issue of agentic and non-agentic power. While both are practical
forms of power, each have significant disparities. One of the main distinctions between
agentic and non-agentic power is the source of power. In essence, what and how is
power’s dawn in its upmost organic form?
Source of power is the fourth and final element of non-agentic power. In any
analysis of power, perhaps the most important element to identify is where the seed of
power is, and where it stems from. There is a considerable contrast between the source of
power in an agentic relationship, and the source of power for non-agents. In an agentic
relationship, the agents themselves create and hold power. With that said, there are
countless theories on the origins of power. Arendt recalls that Voltaire declared that
power exists on a basis of agentic relations, saying, “consists in making others act as I
choose” (Cited in Arendt 1970, p. 36). In turn, Mao famously said, “political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun” (Zedong 1938). Even Nye’s realist theory of hard power
would agree with Mao’s sentiment that military aggression and incentives could grant an
actor’s demands. In contrast, Dahl focuses more on agents than carrots and sticks,
revealing actor A creates power by influencing B to do something he otherwise wouldn’t
have done. In Barnett and Duvall’s “structural” theory, power originates within the
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system of actors. Power, then, for a master and his slave, is conceived at the mere
existence of slavery.
Societal norms cannot be backtracked, meaning one cannot clearly prove or
explain the reasons humans act the way they do. The only way to predict human behavior
is by looking at the type of power that is present – agentic, non-agentic, or some
combination of both. Foucault’s theory of discipline suggests otherwise, proposing that
subtle behaviors dictate how people act. Minor behaviors, for Foucault, stem from his
theory of discipline, thus theorizing that societal norms themselves hold power. As noted,
this theory comes at the intersection of agentic and non-agentic power.
Finally, in a non-agentic situation, the source of power is emergence. This is the
argument and focus of the fourth dimension of non-agentic power. Emergence is the
culmination of many entities that create a larger system, event, movement, etc. There are
two phases that create a non-agentic power: First, there is an emergence stage where
many different actors contribute to a larger power. Second, the power in which the
emergence takes place grows, uncontrollably, and the non-agent develops its own power.
This is a similar concept to what we discussed with the Occupy movement. Many
people took to social media to ‘join the movement,’ despite not knowing the direction it
was heading in. In context, this is the emergence stage, where the masses collaborated in
the same action to create a greater, more irrepressible power. Control is also a significant
factor in emergence, since non-agentic power is uncontrolled, (by any single agent, at
least) and paradoxically disciplined by its own extensive reach. Therefore, we see that
without leaders of the Occupy movement, it created a mind of its own.
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Emergence gets to the heart of non-agentic power. If everything were predictable,
power wouldn’t exist. Every agent would know when and where to act, leaving nothing
up to chance. However, systems that agents contribute toward are more powerful than
any conscious actor. This power dictates how all agents act, no matter the size. Beneath
non-agentic power there are no ways to redress grievances for agents – nobody controls
the power, and there is nobody to turn to when something goes wrong.
*****
In the next chapter we will be discussing complexity and risk. The word ‘risk’
inherently implies negativity, a decline towards collapse or failure. However, it is
essential to consider the positive aspects of risk. Investments can be seen as ‘risky,’
meaning there is a greater probability that returns on investment will be negative than
positive. Risk does not guarantee depletion, however. Sometimes the most lucrative
investments are risky from the start. On a simpler level, think of a speeding car. The
faster the car goes, the quicker the driver gets to his/her destination. In doing so, the risk
of getting pulled over or crashing goes up, but so does expediency. So while it may be
risky to drive above the speed limit, it is also more efficient.
This chasm between risk and efficiency is noteworthy to consider in next chapter.
The trove of systemic risk literature explored by Centeno, Urry and others take a subtly
negative stance on risk. In many ways, this thesis has agreed along the same lines,
viewing global interconnectivity of agentic relations as a daunting prospect. This
negativity of systemic risk is not universal across all cases; instead, there is a gradient to
measure risk. A system or power may be on a path of risk, but still operate productively.
The speeding car could be, if it doesn’t slow down, heading toward a speeding ticket.
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Though, it is impossible to predict when, and if, that ticket will come. Maybe there are
minimal police officers on the road that day, or maybe there is another crash that diverts
police elsewhere. Even if the car is driving on a path of ‘risk,’ it doesn’t contingently
guarantee failure.
Complex systems of power abide by the same circumstances. Often times, as a
system’s complexity increases, its efficiency and risk factors increase conjointly. We can
use the example of the Internet and technology. Twenty years ago, dictionaries and
encyclopedias were slower than Google is today. As such, we have seen agentic
connections skyrocket, along with efficiency to globally communicate via email, Skype,
texting, etc. Despite these advancements, we cannot ignore the potential risk that each
new agentic connection poses. We cannot predict when the system will tip, causing a
systemic failure. Therefore, we examine the attributes of these complex systems,
assessing their power, in order to find a dual perspective to look at such powers, both by
admiring efficiency but respecting its potential risk.
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Chapter 4: Distant Cousins: Complexity, Power and Risk
***
So far, we have identified the defining factors of agentic and non-agentic power.
We have not yet looked at the benefits of such power, but more importantly, the potential
hazards. This leads us to the field of systemic risk. Studying systemic risk within a scope
of power is imperative. In order to do so, we must first define several terms that describe
systemic risk, which will lead to the discussion of how it differs from non-agentic power.
As I will argue, a collective system with the four elements of non-agentic power could be
dangerous, as its interconnectivity could pose a prospect for systemic failure – this
systemic power has been displayed in the financial crisis. And, when a system fails, the
largest concern is who, or what, fills the void of power left behind in the vacuum.
It must be noted that there are some potential benefits to highly interconnected
systems, namely efficiency. While the speeding can get to destinations faster, it also
involves greater risk. We have seen this displayed through widespread and rapid
globalization in the past century. Although interconnectivity is beneficial, we do not
know when, or if, these systemic connections will ultimately fail. Just like children
playing on a seesaw, there is a distinct tipping point that pushes one side to the ground.
This is an essential element we will explore in this chapter.

49

Framework

In this chapter we will focus on four main terms that deal with global power:
complexity, complex systems, non-agentic power, and systemic risk. Of course, my main
contribution within these closely related terms is non-agentic power. My aim in this
chapter is to differentiate, and in doing so, create a framework in which non-agentic
power can be specifically identified within a complex situation. Figure 1 below creates a
visual representation of these four terms. Note that complexity is the largest and most
broad term, while systemic risk is the narrowest classification of a complex power.

Figure 1

This chapter will proceed to filter out the differences between these words,
starting with complexity. At the end of the chapter we will discuss how non-agentic
power has its own designation, and why it is important to classify it individually.
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I. Complexity

Complexity is a vague term. Many things are complex, but that doesn’t offer any
analysis to why or how it is complex. The American legal system is arguably complex,
but so is a recipe for chocolate cake. With that said, neither of those statements actually
tell us anything about the American legal system, or teach us about how to bake the cake.
In order to identify how complexity fits into our investigation of power, we must first
answer the question, where does complexity occur?
Complexity thrives in fluidity; where there is complexity, there is space for
change and evolution. Two of the main elements of fluidity are time and space. In highly
complex situations, time and space are no longer fixed or limited. Rather, things flow –
information, people, and ideas – each on their own, with no affixation to time or locale.
Urry calls this type of complexity “timeless time,” (2003, pp. 18-22), where there is no
set amount of time it takes to complete a task. Rather, events simply happen. We will see
this concept is closely related to non-agentic power. For example, in a factory, (an
agentic power) the factory workers (agents) are on strict timelines—there are deadlines to
produce, manufacture, export, etc. Time is everything in an agentic situation.
On the other side of the spectrum, time and space are deconstructed in situations
where there are circumstances of non-agentic power. “There is a clock time of the mass
production of factory, the timeless time of the computer and the glacial time of the
environment” (Urry 2003, p. 11; see also Castells 1996). In this type of postmodern
‘timeless time’ and vacantly-occupied space, there is a rapidly growing complexity. The
flow of information doesn’t abide by time; it also doesn’t abide by location. The Internet
has no space – it has no factory, no workers punching the clock for work. Agents simply
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act on their own time – responding to emails as they wish, and disengaging from
networks as they please. It is growing so rapidly in fact, that agents can connect to the
Internet nearly anywhere in the world, whether it is from a cell phone or computer.
Structurally, we see a picture that is constantly changing and difficult to track.
Complexity is not just about time and space, however; complexity is also an
adjective to describe a type of system or network. Yet, before moving onto generally
describing a ‘complex system,’ it is crucial to describe the specific complexities that exist
within or beneath systems. In this description, we are not focusing on a system from a
macro level, but rather seeing the nuts and bolts that make up the (un)functioning
machine.
Reductionist scholars perceive complexity by the parts that make up the system.
However, complexity “investigates emergent properties, certain regularities of behaviour
that somehow transcend the ingredients that make them up. Complexity argues against
reductionism, against reducing the whole to the parts” (Urry 2003, p. 13). Complexity
refutes reductionism because many complexities simply cannot be reduced. The financial
crisis, for example, is a complexity that cannot be clearly minimized. We cannot
precisely identify an agent that ‘started’ the crisis. Therefore the power is unbounded in
time, as there is no beginning – and although the crisis is ‘over’ – there is no consensus of
when it ended. Additionally, is not always linearity between cause and effect (think back
to the linearity image in Chapter 3 showing actors A, B, C, and D. There was no linear
connection between the boy with no food and the company headquarters. Only nonagentic power created a faint correlation). Complexities, perhaps most importantly,
contribute to irreversible consequences in elaborate systems.

52

Helbing (2010) breaks down complexity into three camps: Structural complexity,
Dynamic complexity, and Algorithmic Complexity.5 Structural complexity is the most
traditional form of complexity; cars and iPhones are structurally complex because they
are made up of many different pieces. With that said, we still know how a car will
respond, or at least how to use it. The same goes for an iPhone. Structural complexity is
most useful for reductionists who argue that everything can be broken down into pieces,
which together, are classified as complex.
Dynamic Complexity returns to Robert Dahl’s example of roadway traffic. If you
recall, Dahl notes that an actor driving in his car has relative power. Relative, in the sense
that a layperson in everyday clothes cannot control traffic in the same way a policeman
can in his uniform. Therefore, although both instances are examples of agentic power, the
policeman still holds more influential power than the layman. As such, we see a
hierarchical structure within the concept of agentic power forming.
Though Dahl’s example is classic and principal in power studies, it is also limited.
Dahl only focuses on agentic relations, but every agent driving in his car is actually
acting within non-agentic power – the traffic itself. This leads us into complex systems,
the next dominion in our study of complexities and power.

II. Complex System

The actions of self-guided agents on a freeway are highly interconnected. In fact,
traffic patterns are a prime example of Helbing’s Dynamic Complexity, as well as nonagentic power. Roadway patterns are so connected that small-scale events can have large5

We will not be discussing Algorithmic Complexity since it is based on computational programming and it
is not relevant to our discussion on power.
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scale implications. Leading emergent risk scholar Miguel Centeno has indicated that nonagentic systems are nonlinear and disproportional in size; he uses the example of a flat
tire in heavy Detroit traffic that could lead to the cancelation of numerous flights in
Tokyo.6 Chaos theorists agree that seismic events can occur at random, causing large or
small results.7 Consequently, we are all reacting to a sequence of consequences caused by
an actor’s movement or action within a complex world. At the most fundamental level,
we can say there is no causal relationship between two actors, or two events. One cannot
always prove that B did something as a result of A’s action; on the contrary, there could
be non-agentic forces in play. This is my definition of nonlinearity outlined in Chapter 3.
The boy with no food was connected to his mother’s company’s headquarters in a
nonlinear bond. The cause and effect line could not be conspicuously drawn, but it was
there, derived from a non-agentic power.
Traffic, as Centeno describes, is unpredictable, since we cannot predict how other
actors will drive. Time, velocity, and location are all unpredictable factors of the complex
roadway system. Helbing uses Figure 2 image below to depict the traffic example, where
the yellow peaks represent traffic jams and congestions – completely unpredictable
aspects for the drivers as agents within the complex system:

6

Centeno does not connect the dots between the heavy traffic in Detroit and the cancelled flights in Tokyo.
Although the actual scenario is far-fetched, Centeno is addressing the unpredictability of events in time. Perhaps the
Detroit traffic delays a pilot who then cannot fly from out of the Detroit Metro Airport, which then delays the
connecting plane to Tokyo. There is a nonlinearity causality, which in a complex system like air travel can prompt
challenges and issues for passengers.
7

The quintessential example is the “butterfly effect,” depicting that a tiny change—like a butterfly flapping its
wings—can cause monumental change.
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Freeway traffic can be a dynamically complex system, involving many independently-thinking drivers in a
larger system. The self-organized patterns of traffic can lead to traffic jams and congestion, which is hard to
predict for each singular actor involved.

Figure 2

Prior to a system becoming “at risk,” there first must be a system. This illustrates
the intricate subtleties that lay between such terms. As I will argue, all systemic risks, or
“emergent risks” as they are sometimes called, occur under conditions of non-agentic
power. This means that all systemic risks abide by the four elements of non-agentic
power that I outlined in Chapter 3: nonlinearity, intentionality, collectivity, and source.
Notably, not all systems are at risk, and not all instances of non-agentic power are
systemic risks. Figure 1 shows the overlap between the four closely related camps.
While all at-risk systems exercise non-agentic power, not all complex systems are
non-agentic. Here, we see there are definitive “tipping points” with complexities. When
does a normal complexity turn into a complex system? When do complex systems
become non-agentic? When does a complex system become at-risk? The answer is found
in emergence.
I propose that tipping points occur through the quantity of emergent units.
Emergence grows by the contribution of the collective, where individual agents act in
unison to form a larger cluster. Notably, emergence can come in various forms – ideas,
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actions, and transactions can all be small emergent factors that flip the switch, causing a
complex system to change its shape, direction, or size. It could, potentially, push the
system to the brink of collapse. In any scenario, an emergent risk is unceasingly a type of
non-agentic power, no matter what type of emergent factor it may be. I will continue to
outline the nuances of the differentiations in the later sections of the chapter; the key
point is that emergence is the evolutionary character between these related terms.
Before delving into the intricacies of systemic risk and looking at examples, we
must first identify what a complex system is at a basic level, and see how it may vary
from instances of non-agentic power that is an emergent risk. There are several key
attributes of complex systems we can look at in order to determine how at-risk it may be.
Mitchell (2009) offers three defining factors of complex systems: collective behavior,
signaling and information processing, and adaptation.
First and foremost, complex systems are formed by the behavior of the collective.
This is Mitchell’s first aspect of complex systems, and my third element of non-agentic
power: collectivity. Mitchell extends his analysis to include the absence of leaders or a
clear direction, which I also alluded to in the presentation of the Occupy movement. With
these correlations, we see that non-agentic power is an offspring of a complex system.
Mitchell’s second common property of a complex system is information
processing, which is influenced both by internal and external environments. Essentially, a
complex system is highly reactive to the behavior of its agents, like the herd mentality.
Information that passes quickly within a complex system could easily change the shape
of the system. With that said, complex systems are also responsive to external,
environmental factors as well. This is another aspect of information processing.
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In an ant colony, a highly complex system, ant movements usually depend on
environmental factors like weather and terrain. Still, each ant can act on its own,
demonstrating that Mitchell’s theory on internal information processing is applicable.
Additionally, while the environment affects complex systems, agents within the system
also affect the environment in turn. For example, in the case of global warming, humans
consume more energy products, (air conditioners, fans, etc.) as warming increases. This
positive feedback only continues to harm the environment.
The final property Mitchell presents is that all complex systems adapt. That is,
complex systems exist to survive—like any mammal—and will change its behavior at all
costs in order to stay alive. In this hypothesis of adaptation, Mitchell suggests complex
systems are conscious of survival, and therefore have intentionality. This theory would
contradict my definition of non-agentic power, which denies intentionality; yet, Mitchell
is outlining a complex system, not a non-agentic power. Here, we see a strict dividing
line between a complex system and non-agentic power, but illustrating just how close
they can be from a structural standpoint [see Fig 1]. Finally, it is worth mentioning that
some scholars indicate a split between adaptive complex systems, and nonadaptive
complex systems; my definition of non-agentic power would fall into the latter category.
Mitchell does not accept this differentiation.

III. Systemic Risk8

8

We will skip the analysis of non-agentic power here, as we have previously described and non-agentic
power. Note that in a linear explanation of power and complexity, (as shown in Figure 1) non-agentic
powers would be outlined here.

57

We have clearly stated the attributes of non-agentic power. The next step in this
theoretical analysis is to assess the fate of such growing and uncontrollable powers. In a
related literature on systemic risk, this discussion has been outlined in great detail. In
general, systemic risk research has focused on the quandary of whether the postglobalization era has evolved to such high complexity – a complexity where markets,
networks, and information systems are so interconnected – the entire complex is at risk.
Studies on systemic risk (Rochet and Tirole 1996; Haldane and May 2011; Billio 2012)
have mainly focused on financial systems, inter-agent transactions, and bank lending. The
financial crisis in 2008 has been viewed as a systemic failure, where one part of the
system brought the global economy to its knees.
There have been many examples of systemic risk in the past. Enron, Black
Monday in 1987, and finally the global financial crisis in 2008, which “triggered an
estimated loss of 4-20 trillion US$” (Helbing 2010, p. 2), though the number is likely
greater today. In the example of climate change, a very pressing systemic risk, “The
related reduction of the world gross domestic product is expected to amount to 0.6 trillion
US$ per year or more” (Ibid). The question remains, are systemic failures inevitable and
unstoppable? With the mere existence of non-agentic power, will there be an inherent risk
of collapse?
Examples of current risks are all around us. The rise of the Internet was faster
than any other technology; there are over 1 billion Internet users in the world; Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg has even expressed his desire to have every human join
Facebook – possibly creating the largest and most interconnected non-agentic power. As
a result of these interconnected systems, the distance between actors is diminishing.
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There are more international travelers than ever before; the time it takes to communicate
with someone next door is no different than someone halfway around the world. Time
and space could be ‘de-materializing’ (Urry 2003).
One could argue that the distance between actors is decreasing as a result of
globalization. Globalization, although certainly complex, does not exhibit characteristics
of a non-agentic power, but an emergent factor:
Globalization is not the property of the individual actors or territorial units. It is
an emergent feature of the capitalist economy as a whole, developing from the
interconnections between different agents, especially through new forms of timespace ‘distanciation’ across the globe and compression of the time-space
relations. (Urry 2003, p. 4)
The degree of agentic interconnectivity from globalization is dense. Globalization not
only connects agents to each other, but it connects them on multiple levels. Each node is
not just connected by one line, but many. Agents are not just linked by trade, but also
through technology, communication, and open source. Complexity, as previously
discussed, marks the beginning toward systemic risk. As the system becomes more
complex, other emergent factors join in – more people, more Internet users, and more
networks. As the world expands, more emergent units contribute to the complex system,
and the closer we are pushed to global systemic risk.
The question remains, how does a system become at-risk? The answer is
emergence. Emergence is perhaps the most important aspect of non-agentic power and
complex systems alike. This is why “systemic risk” has been routinely called “emergent
risk,” and why the third property of non-agentic power I identified is collectivity, a
contributing aspect of emergence. Emergence, compared to systemic risk, is not a new
term. Many sociologists have used emergence to describe contributing factors to social
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systems and their size, power, breadth, and personalities (see Goldstein 1999; Holland
1999). Keith Sawyer’s Mechanisms of Emergence (2005) also provides a detailed history
of emergence within sociology studies, and is quite applicable to this investigation of
systemic risk.

IV. Emergence
Primarily, emergence serves the purpose of reduction; in order to analyze
complex systems, we must see what parts it is made of. Emergent properties are
irreducible. This is perhaps the most defining quality of an emergent unit. In a complex
system, like the physiology of a human body, arguably the smallest emergent units are
atoms and molecules. For scientists, emergence is a useful perspective and tool. I have
already refuted reductionist theory; it is essential to understand that not all complexities
may are reducible to each atom or molecule. We may be able to recognize larger parts of
the whole – appendages, if you will.
Urry uses an example of a pile of sand. From a reductionist perspective, the
emergent units of the pile are the grains of sand. As I mentioned, the division between
risk and a regular complex system is based on the quantity of emergent units. So, the
addition of a single grain of sand on top of the pile could cause a large avalanche, or have
no effect at all. The first describes the pile of sand as a “complex system”; the latter
describes the sand as a “systemic risk.” In either case, the addition of emergent units
always pushes the system toward the ‘risk’ tipping point.
There are two main concepts to analyze while looking at a systemic risk:
prediction and control. We will first look at the concept of prediction. With the presence
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of a non-agentic power, we do not know when its qualities will change. Meaning, we
cannot predict which grain of sand will make the pile of sand fall. All we know is that if
we add more grains of sand on the pile, we add risk, pushing it closer to failure. People
can guess which emergent unit will lead to the tipping point – which sand grain will
cause the collapse – but there is no evidence to determine these triggers.
The control aspect of systemic risk is closer related to consequences. In a complex
system like traffic, as we discussed, all agents lose control due to the “irreducible
randomness” (Helbing 2010, p. 9) of the traffic. Of course, if agents could control traffic
patterns, there would be no delays, nobody would be late for work, and efficiency would
be maximized. Yet, agents cannot control the behavior of others. We see then, there is no
way to control the outcomes of complexity and risk, and therefore risk is free to expand,
untamed. We will now head deeper into the notion of emergence.
Emergence does not only mean the sum is greater than its parts. Rather, “there are
other system effects that are somehow different than its parts” (Urry 2003, p. 24). We see
that the effects of the system, which contribute to how agents act, are in fact different
than the parts themselves. Thus, emergent factors are not simply the grains of sand in the
pile, but also the force, time, and space, which made the grains arrive in the first place.
Since time and space are such key factors in complexity, we now see them appear again
in our analysis of emergence. Here we have reached a layered understanding of
emergence, which again rejects the reductionist method of viewing complex systems.
In many complex systems, we cannot identify the sand grains – we cannot
recognize the absolute individual actors that caused the financial crisis. Instead, we can
identify what Sawyer calls are collective emergent properties, which are emergent units
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that are shared by collective group(s) in the system. In short, if there is a large, complex
system within non-agentic power, we break down emergent properties by group or
network. Figure 3, (Helbing 2010) below represents this level of analysis:

Figure 3

Due to the complexity and size of non-agentic power and complex systems, there
are no social mechanisms to pinpoint why a non-agent is acting in a particular manner.9
As a result, we find collective emergent units within the system.
In short, non-agentic power cannot be completely ‘reduced’ to the agentic level,
meaning we cannot discern every agent in the system. Even after considerable analysis of
the financial collapse, it is impossible to pinpoint a specific agent (person, bank,
institution, agentic transaction, or an agent’s loan, etc.) that caused the downfall. On the
other hand, there have been careful analyses that have identified a series of themes that
could have contributed to the financial crisis: deregulation, lack of transparency, short
selling, subprime lending, interdependencies of major banks, and high frequency trading
are just a few of many possible malpractices (Sawyer 2001). While each category
contributing to the crisis is not narrowed down to specific agent(s), they are indeed much

9

In sociology, a Social Mechanism (SM) aims to explain why people act the way they do. If a person goes
out to dinner, it isn’t enough to say they did so simply because they are hungry. Rather, there are SM’s that
explain why they chose to eat where, and what they ate. SM’s are important to the study of non-agentic
power because in large systems, SM’s do not exist. Instead, we look at collective emergent properties that
combine to create complex systems.
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smaller, more manageable, and less complex systems to look at. Rather than individualist
or agentic, we can now view systems based on collective networks of collective emergent
properties.
This type of social emergence perspective is thus based on the notion that social
properties cannot be reduced to individual property. Sawyer popularizes the phrase
“nonreductive individualism” to explain the process of reduction within complex
systems. To contextualize this theory, we see this ideology sharply contradicts John
Locke’s classical theory of property outlined in his timeless Second Treatise of
Government (1980, Chapter 5), where Locke defines property as anything gained from
labor requiring effort. Locke uses the simple example of picking an apple from a tree,
where the apple becomes the property of man. Locke’s theory is not helpful in an analysis
of systemic complexes, as the specific agent picking the apple is untraceable. As a result,
we group agents or other emergent factors together. Instead of looking at one agent
picking an apple, we can look at the whole apple orchard. When these social properties
globalize and connect, we see emergence from a perspective of multi-agented properties.
Meaning, we can see layered and polymerized10 emergence, forming much stronger and
larger bonds. These complexities create systems that are difficult to collapse.
Complex systems are all around us, and many of them are at-risk, we just hardly
can see it. Electricity grids are one example of systemic risk. Each electrical power plant,
or electrical pole, is like a small node in a giant network. Power lines connect each node,
forming interconnected webs that, over time, fuse with other webs. Figure 4 (Helbing

10

Polymerization is a chemical process where molecules combine to form three-dimensional chains of
polymers.
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2010) below represents the risk of such interconnected systems, particularly when actors
within the system are unconscious of its power.

Figure 4

Figure 4: An example of a blackout of the electrical power grid in Europe. To allow for the
transfer of a ship, one power line had to be temporarily disconnected in Northern Germany (the
gold star). This triggered an overload-related cascading effect, which resulted in a major power
outage over Europe (see black areas). The image illustrates how a small action can cause a
multitude of consequential results in a seemingly unrelated network.

It is unknown at exactly what point in time the European electrical power grid
became a systemic risk – just like it is unknown exactly when the global economy
became vulnerable to a systemic financial crisis. Perhaps the electrical grid became a
systemic risk when the French power lines connected to central Germany’s, or when
Dublin’s electrical lines connected with London. These are the unknown factors of
systemic risk and non-agentic power. What is known, however, is the cascading effects of
one emergent unit within the network, and its detrimental consequences on the rest.
This systemic failure extends much deeper than connected networks and complex
systems. Every agent living in the ‘blackout’ areas shown above were presumably
affected. As a result of the blackout, agentic behaviors were changed – people couldn’t
go to work, cook dinner, or watch TV. This change of behavior is connected, nonlinearly,
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to the non-agentic power of the European electric grid. With each new connected grid,
the European electricity network became closer to a large blackout event; in many ways,
these additions are emergent units. In the next sub-section, we will be discussing how
emergent factors materialize, and how they interact with the social and cultural systems.

A. Attractors

Attractors create energies that dictate how agents in the system behave. Attractors
are built into societies, and in contrast to complexities, are not fluid and changing. Rather,
attractors can be seen as the center, or hub, of power. “If a dynamic system does not
move over through all possible parts of a potential or phase space but instead occupies a
restricted part of it, then this is said to result from an attractor” (Urry 2003, p. 26; see also
Capra 1996 Ch. 6). We see human actors constantly coming up with ideas to change
society; attractors are the driving force behind how actors think and act. We can look to
Baker’s theory of “centriphery” (1993) to further explain the notion of attractors.
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Figure 5: Centriphery

The centriphery is a transfer of energy, information, capital, and ideas in which
actors are attracted to the centriphery of a system—the center. This, in turn, creates an
“entropy” where the peripheries of the circle are left disadvantaged by the unstoppable
mass migration toward the attractor. The centriphery is a very powerful notion; centering
becomes an uncontrollable force that agents simply act in accordance with. Baker writes:
Centering, then is an ‘attractor’, creating order by funneling energy and
information towards itself and disorder by peripheralizing its environment. It
produces a world on the periphery where the flow of energy and information is
away to somewhere else…the center has an entropic effect on the periphery,
causing increased randomness and increasing amounts of unusable resources.
(Baker 1993, p. 139)
One example of ‘centriphication’ is the agglomeration of the technology industry in
Silicon Valley. Unconsciously, but rapidly, Silicon Valley became the hub – the
centriphery – of power for technology. Why Silicon Valley? Why not Los Angeles or
New York City? The answer is within the attractor. As a result of the centriphication of
Silicon Valley, it leaves companies and actors worse off on the periphery. Meaning, if a
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company consciously decides to stay in New York and not move to Silicon Valley, they
could be at a disadvantage. The attractor is a unique component of non-agentic power. It
is notable to include there is not a “global centriphery,” but rather a number of attractors
that influence the way agents, networks, and collective groups act.
Once the centriphication occurs in one area, or through an idea, it then becomes
an emergent factor. In the early stages of Silicon Valley’s tech agglomeration, it likely
could have been seen as “complex.” Many agents, (start-ups and young CEO’s) traveled
to the Valley as a result of the attractor. Soon after, as more emergent units (larger
companies, investors, and more people) arrived, the mere quantity turned Silicon Valley
into a complex system. Now, one could argue that Silicon Valley has many qualities of
non-agentic power. Let’s probe this claim.
Silicon Valley’s decisions and innovations could have a nonlinear effect on the
rest of the global technology market. Its collective behavior is certainly highly
interconnected, where revolving doors between start-ups and older companies are
commonplace. Not to mention, its rapid growth has resulted in a complete absence of
agentic intentionality, leading to an uncontrollable growth. Finally, the source of Silicon
Valley’s power is no longer in agentic hands, as more agents are joining the network for
its attractiveness. It seems that, on the surface at least, Silicon Valley abides by the four
dimensions of non-agentic power. Certainly this requires a deeper analysis – but as a
generalization, Silicon Valley’s rapid growth is exemplary in its formation and
production of non-agentic power. This non-agentic emergence can be directly linked the
concept of attractors.
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B. Fragility

One of the main characteristics used to assess emergence and risk is fragility.
Fragility itself is an emergent factor in a complex system; as a system grows, and more
emergent pieces join, it becomes more fragile. This is a positive-feedback loop, a
common characteristic of emergence. So, with more emergence, there is more fragility,
making the inherent risk of failure in non-agentic power increase.
Traditionally, this concept has been viewed in an economic model of standard
deviation. However, emergence does not abide by the standard deviation model.

Figure 5
Figure 5: When system components interact strongly, the normally distributed behaviour of
separated system elements often becomes power-law distributed of separated system elements
often becomes (approximately) power-law distributed. As a consequence, fluctuations of any size
can occur in the system, and extreme events are much more frequent than expected. Note that
power laws are typical for a system at a critical point, known as a “tipping point”.11

Figure 5 (Helbing 2010) represents the relationship between the size of a complex
system and the potential risk of failure. A standard distribution suggests the more times

11

Description of Figure 5 directly quoted from Helbing 2010, p. 5.
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you do something, the more often you expect it to happen. This is depicted by the classic
example of flipping a coin. The more times a coin is flipped, the higher probability heads
and tails will be equal. This is shown with the red line, “normal distribution” in Figure 5.
Yet, Helbing argues that systemic risk actually follows a fat or heavy-tailed distribution,
meaning variance is unbounded and the potential for risk is more likely. As a result, with
a fat tail distribution, there is more variance, more randomness, and more deviation from
the mean. This fat-tail theory is seen in the green line in Figure 5, representing the
possibility that big, dramatic events can happen more frequently.
This fat-tail has been illustrated in earlier examples like the global financial crisis.
Although the global economy could have already been viewed ‘at-risk’ in 2008, it still
took a large, infrequent, and unpredicted event to crash the system. Again, this tipping
point is hard to pin down – was it the housing market failure, lack of regulation, rating
agencies, etc. – nonetheless, the unpredictable nature of the fat-tail coincides with the
decline of the global economy. Due to the complexity and interconnectivity of markets,
the financial system became defenseless against the fat-tail event that ‘rocked the boat.’
The fat tail description reinforces the notion that fragility is an emergent factor.
The more agents that join a system, the more fragile it becomes, which is supported by
the demonstration of the fat tail diagram. As the system becomes more fragile, one
random event could drive the system to its brink, pushing it over the tipping point,
ultimately causing a systemic failure. If less complex, the global financial system would
less susceptible to systemic risk. This is undeniable. Of course, we once again see a
double-edged sword, as the increase of complexity increases revenue by connecting
markets, agents, and trade networks around the world.
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Notably, agents within systems intentionally put in scaffolding to ensure it does
not fail. There are outlines and protocols in order to ensure systems, buildings, and
companies do not fail. Yet, as mentioned, systems themselves lack intentions and cannot
always be controlled. Since non-agentic power acts in unpredictable patters, preventative
measures taken by actors within the system do not always prevail.
*****
In this chapter we started from a very broad perspective in viewing power by
looking at complexity; we have since gone to a narrower level, looking at emergence,
attractors, and fragility. In between such polarized accounts of power, we reviewed
complex systems, non-agentic power, and systemic risk. Thus, we saw the entire
spectrum of power is long; more importantly, the terms that characterize power are just as
important as the concept itself. Without emergence, there wouldn’t be complexity – and
without complexity, there wouldn’t be complex systems. Each of these terms are deeply
interconnected, just like the networks that describe them.
The qualities of these terms certainly overlap, and these uniformities are depicted
in Figure 1 that shows the funneling nature of complexity to systemic risk. Yet, the
similarities are overridden by subtle nuances outlined in this chapter. Perhaps most
relevant is the distinction between non-agentic power and systemic risk. We outlined the
qualities of non-agentic power in Chapter 3, and described the potential hazards of
systemic risk in this chapter. The relationship is a delicate one; there are features of nonagentic power that can stand alone, separate from systemic risk. Other powers, classified
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in the systemic risk category, contain qualities of non-agentic power but are comprised of
more emergent units.
In the next chapter, Chapter 5, we will look at case studies of the Internet of
Things and determine what, if any, the conditions of risk and power are. We will be
considering the following questions: Are there certain aspects of the Internet that are
complex, and only complex? Are there circumstances of non-agentic power within the
Internet of Things? Is the Internet an example of widespread systemic risk? What role do
agents play in catalyzing risk?

71

Chapter 5: The Internet of Things: Case Studies of Power
***
The Internet of Things is an overarching term that encompasses any device that
connects to the Internet, (phones, computers, tablets, handheld devices, etc.) (Cicconi).
Today, the IoT is a growing and evolving classification. In 2008, the number of devices
that can connect to the Internet exceeded the number of humans on earth (Ibid). Any
device that has Internet capability, transfers data, and connects with other networks, is
simply, a thing of the Internet. All of these devices fall into the contemporary category
known as the IoT. With new innovations being introduced, the IoT is on a path of
unprecedented development. In 1993 there were roughly 50 websites on the Internet. By
the year 2000, there were over five million (Nye 2011, p. 114). Websites aren’t the only
things growing and expanding. Technological fashion is a recently booming industry with
the rise of Apple Watch, Fitbit, and Garmin, where watches and bracelets can track GPS
signals, heart rates, and steps per day. All of this data can be uploaded to the Internet with
a simple click. Technologies are now even produced for animals; if an animal gets sick, a
data signal can be immediately sent to its owner or farmer as an alert (Hardy 2015).
These cutting-edge devices are all new ways for agents to connect, interact, and
communicate with the aid of the Internet.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the progression of complexity diminishes
the importance of time and space. Complex things do not claim territories or respond to
lapsed time. Complexities do, however, vary in use and purpose. As displayed in Figure 1
in the previous chapter, a complex entity is the broadest in the conversation of power,
followed by complex systems, non-agentic power, and systemic risk. In this chapter, we
will look at the Internet of Things (IoT), and analyze how it can fall into any one of these
categories, based on which microcosm we look at. Essentially, we will be looking at
different ‘snapshots’ of the IoT – each picture will give a new perspective on the power
of the Internet and its complexity. It is becoming nearly impossible to classify digital
information; so difficult, because the amount of online data and information increases
tenfold every five years (Nye 2011). Non-agentic digital power has grown uncontrollable
– almost to unimaginable lengths. Yet, through an analysis of the IoT, we can break down
its complexities into different camps in attempt to simplify its span.
Efficiency is often cited as the most important outcome of technological
advancement, like in the case of the IoT. Centeno (2012) echoes this sentiment by noting
that efficiency is an encouraging aspect of global, systemic interconnectivity. Yet Tim
O’Reilly, technology expert and founder of O’Reilly Media, says that efficiency is not
the sole purpose for advancement in the IoT. Rather, “The IoT is really about human
augmentation. The applications are profoundly different when you have sensors and data
driving the decision-making” (Hardy 2015). The noteworthy point that O’Reilly mentions
is the fact that data, not people or agents, become decision-makers in the IoT. Despite
agents acting as operators and consumers, data becomes the decision-maker.
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O’Reilly uses the example of Uber, which facilitates the connection between an
agent and their transportation needs. In contrast to a regular taxi, passengers using Uber
know precisely when their driver is coming and where they will be picked up. The entire
experience is augmented for agents, and the decision-making process, from an agentic
standpoint, is eliminated. Also, as innovators become closer to creating driverless and
self-parking cars, agentic decisions could be a fading part of the past. Indeed, Centeno
and O’Reilly would probably agree – Uber increases efficiency for both the client and
driver. However, efficiency is not the only factor to consider with innovative
technologies. Who is the decision-maker? Do agents still have power? If time is taken out
of the equation, and passengers know when the Uber will arrive, does this eliminate “the
unknown?” With the rise of these questions, one can no longer exclusively view
complexities of the IoT through a lens of efficiency, and therefore it is necessary to
broaden the scope of complex analyses.
We will move forward in this chapter using the IoT as a case study for our
analysis of complexity, systems, power, and risk. For each section, we will use a case
study from the IoT to contextualize each differentiation. We will start with complexity.

I. Complexity
Ø Net Neutrality
The Internet, like the rest of agent-driven markets, is also consumer-based. This
means that agents using an IoT device influence how service providers send data. This
brings up the issue of net neutrality, the concept of a free and open Internet. As the
Internet exists today, it is highly complex, free and open. A ruling against net neutrality
would destroy this complexity, giving agents (particularly service providers) more power
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and control over the Internet market. Before looking at the potential for agentic control
over open Internet, let us first investigate the complexity of the IoT as it stands today.
Complex things do not belong to a space or time. Fluidity of the Internet domain
is expressed through continuous transfers of information between networks. With the
IoT, information that flows between service providers and IoT devices are, essentially,
packages of data. Data is what connects agents, and what ultimately brings the ‘product’
to consumers. For example, Netflix has been a leading name surrounding the controversy
of net neutrality, and reasonably so. This is because agents pay Netflix to stream movies
and TV shows on numerous IoT devices. The complexity expands here, since the shows
and movies that agents stream are essentially large sets of data that come from service
providers like Comcast and Verizon.
The abolishment of net neutrality would give advantage to websites like Netflix,
who would pay service providers for a faster connection speed. Agents using Netflix
would get their data much quicker, as opposed to an agent using a disenfranchised site or
company. The prospect of this reality completely destroys the notion of complexity and
equality. In a free and open Internet, the fluidity of data and information flows are
uncontrollable. Yet, once particular agents (the wealthy ones) begin to control the flow of
information, a valuable aspect of complexity is lost: time.
Time and demand are profoundly related in a consumer-based market. Consumers
respond based on time efficiency; nobody wants to wait an hour for a sandwich to be
made at a deli, wait days in line for a ticket to a baseball game, or have a movie pause
every ten minutes to buffer and load. If Netflix were able to pay service providers a
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higher rate in return for faster data connectivity, the playing field would be un-evened,
and time would become of upmost importance.
With the presence of time, the complexity of the Internet would diminish –
perhaps even disappear. Currently, IoT complexity survives – and grows – each day with
the existence of a free and open Internet. Without net neutrality, a specific hierarchy will
form; with a hierarchy, comes control, a serious threat to open Internet. A pure market
can’t be controlled by anyone, because if you try to control it in a way that agents do not
like, they can switch to another option. Yet, a few big fish could eat the small fish, posing
a difficult situation for some.
The transfer of data and information is unpredictable. This is where complexity is
born. If, suddenly, an agent could pay for data to be delivered quicker, then that freedom
of ‘timeless time’ would disappear, taking complexity along with it. In February 2015 the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) upheld a ruling on net neutrality, meaning
the complexity of the IoT will remain, at least for some time.

II. Complex Systems
Ø Open Source
The tipping point from complexity to complex systems occurs through the quantity
of emergent units. First, let’s look at an example of a complex website, like Amazon, to
clarify this point. On a regulated website like Amazon, there are strict rules and
ownership. Additionally, software creates boundaries in which agents can and cannot act.
In short, there are clear-cut roles; consumers on Amazon can browse and buy products, as
well as rate and comment, contributing to its ‘reputation’ market. Even so, agentic
capacities on Amazon are limited. Developers of the website, or moderators, are the only
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agents that can change information and data on the site as well. I, for example, cannot
change the price of a product on Amazon.
In this section I will outline the specifics of open source, first describing its
benefits, then moving onto illustrate its potential downsides. Open source software
completely dismantles the notion of agentic complexity on websites like Amazon, turning
a complex website into a collective network. This is where complex systems separate
from regular complexities – where the number of agents increases. Open source
welcomes collaboration, joint-work, and collective involvement. In comparison to
Amazon, this is radically different.
Let’s use the example of a can of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola has its ingredients listed
on the back of its cans, but nobody can make Coca-Cola in their kitchen. You must have
specific knowledge to reverse-engineer Coca-Cola production. As consumers, we can still
enjoy Coca-Cola ourselves, but we can't reproduce it. Open source, on the other hand, is a
constantly changing and evolving recipe that all agents can contribute toward (Weber
2004). Linux, for example, is the most popular and widely used open source operating
system. In the year 2000, Linux had developed into a flexible and robust system used by
“perhaps 20 million people worldwide, with an annual growth rate of nearly 200%”
(Weber 2000, p. 4). Linux has linked agents together online through collective
collaboration, thus forming a highly complex system.
The paramount example of open source in today’s IoT is Wikipedia. Wikipedia is
an online and open encyclopedia. Not only can anyone read its information, but its
openness allows anyone to contribute to its over 4 million pages (Wikipedia 2014). Open
source programming adds collectivity to a complex system, in such a way that complexity
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on its own cannot achieve. In other words, complexity does not involve the number of
agents that complex systems do.
Historically, the dissemination of information is extremely agentic. No more than
one or two, sometimes three individuals would collectively write any single article,
journal or book. Before Wikipedia, there was no such article co-authored by fifty or a
hundred different people, varying from American professors to Chinese politicians and
Indian mechanics. Wikipedia has shifted the norm, allowing multiple agents to connect
and join a singular, functional mind. The results are extraordinary.
Possibly the most popular quality of Wikipedia is that it’s free; users do not have
to pay a cent to learn and contribute. But more interesting to our discussion is the
question of why agents contribute to open source. In fact, there is no concrete incentive
for agents to contribute – no compensation, recognition, or reward. Notably, in a study
titled What Motivates Wikipedians, Oded Nov found that “fun” and “ideology” were the
leading motivating factors for agents contributing their time and knowledge to Wikipedia
(Nov 2007). Career advancement, on the other hand, was found to be one of the smallest
factors. So, we see a fascinating dichotomy that suggests a natural tendency for agents to
gravitate towards collective, open source projects. Simply put, people enjoy adding to
open source, and believe in the purpose of helping others while entertaining themselves.
The tendency for agents to collectively add to a network, and enjoy doing so, is
tremendously important for the growth of complex systems. The more agents that join the
movement, the more complex a system will grow. This proposal that agents do not need
incentives to contribute to a system is critical; it indicates that complexity can grow
naturally, where actors and emergence willingly add to a network. The chance for
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exponential development increases drastically as well. In open source, there is no need
for harassment or intimidation; instead, actors gladly contribute and join as a signal to the
growing attractiveness of the network’s power.
Finally, complex systems and open source are mutually beneficial concepts. In the
example of Wikipedia, authors can add content whenever and wherever they want; these
contributions come at the gains of millions of users. Wikipedia has accelerated learning
with ease, convenience, and efficiency. Yet, there is a significant downside and peril to
open source as well.
Notably, the dangers of open source, in particular, are different than complex
systems as a whole. In open source, the probability of a contributor making an error or
potentially vandalizing web content increases. Yet, the danger relevant to our discussion
is when an insurmountable group of agents contribute to, or join, a network. If the
network becomes overloaded, or precariously interconnected, the system could be at-risk.
For example, on March 10, 2015 Wikipedia filed a lawsuit against the National
Security Agency for unlawful surveillance of its users. Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales
declared the NSA’s surveillance was in violation of Internet users’ First and Fourth
Amendments – freedom of speech and the right to privacy. The lawsuit mainly targeted
the “upstream” mass-surveillance of Internet traffic by the NSA. Wales is critical of the
lack of anonymity his volunteer information-provider have online, saying, “These
volunteers should be able to do their work without having to worry that the United States
government is monitoring what they read and write. Unfortunately, their anonymity is far
from certain” (Wales2015). In certain countries, adding to specific Wikipedia pages can
be dangerous and even illegal. Wales illustrates that NSA surveillance might deter an
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Egyptian from editing a page on government opposition. This type of influence is once
again nonlinear. By unconsciously molding his actions and thoughts, the NSA is
nonlinearly connected to the Egyptian man. As such, with the NSA monitoring which
agent is adding what information, it is taking the “free” and “open” aspects of Wikipedia
away.
With the participation of NSA surveillance over Wikipedia, we see that this small
window into the Internet cannot be fully categorized as “non-agentic” power. As a whole,
the Internet is a non-agentic power, as it encompasses the four dimensions of non-agentic
power. But, as Wales discussed, the NSA has transparent intentions to monitor and
control information on Wikipedia. So while “open source” certainly embodies the
collectivity aspect of non-agentic power, it fails to abandon intentionality and therefore
falls in the “complex system” classification.
Later, we will move onto review the dimension of systemic risk by using a case
study on web viruses. First, though, migrate from a complex system to an example of
non-agentic power in the context of the IoT. We will use a policy study as an example of
how the Internet has qualities of non-agentic power, but that could be changing.

III. Non-Agentic Power
Ø A. Introduction
Perhaps the most common aspect involved in the IoT is the concept of a network.
We discussed networks in Chapter 3, criticizing the term for its vagueness and variety of
uses. My critique of networks mostly revolved around the term social networking, which
has now become a natural part of our youngest generation’s vocabulary. The technical
aspects of networks are quite interesting in the discussion of complexity and risk. Castells
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describes the fluidity of networks, describing how agents can freely join networks upon
their desire:
A network is a set of interconnected nodes, the distance between social positions
being shorter where such positions constitute nodes within a network as opposed
to those lying outside that particular network. Networks are dynamic open
structures so long as they continue to effect communication with new nodes.
(Urry 2003, p. 9; see also Castells 1996)
Networks are constantly changing, in the sense that a ‘node’ or ‘agent’ can join and leave
freely. We have expressed this before. Even as a node disappears, the network can
rearrange and change its shape, never missing a beat. Today, the freedom agents have to
join and leave networks is clearly exhibited in the IoT. With the press of a button, an
agent can create a new email address, deactivate their Facebook account, write a blog, or
delete a Tweet. Whether agents add or subtract from the network is somewhat irrelevant;
the Internet still lives and thrives, no matter how its innumerable agents/nodes act and
respond.
Information is one piece of complexities that we have not yet discussed, but in our
discussion of the IoT, information is incredibly pertinent. To start the conversation on
information, let’s look at where information comes from, and where it goes – at least
from a theoretical perspective.
When an agent engages with the Internet, we can classify this relationship as
agentic. There is a singular action, like sending an email, which can be depicted as AàB.
As explained, it is the collective emergence of agents that advance the complexity of a
system to non-agentic power. Here, however, we are only concerned with the information
put forth to the IoT by the agent. Once an agent puts information on the Internet, it is no
longer private. Facebook posts, for example, belong to Facebook once posted online.
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Online blogs might belong to WordPress or Tumblr. Private emails sent from Gmail
belong to Google. The moral of the story is that privacy in the digital age is delicate and
tricky. Since our overall conversation is about power, we can say it is truly difficult to
discern who ‘owns’ what information.
In earlier chapters we have stated that the Internet exists under conditions of nonagentic power. The Internet’s general makeup of networks is nonlinear and produces
power through its makeup of agents, which as a collective, lacks intentions. As a whole,
the Internet is significantly more powerful than the agents who contribute to it. Yet aside
from agents, how can one analyze what “makes-up” the Internet? Perhaps information
that agents disclose is the real emergent factor contributing to non-agentic power.
Without information, the IoT would be powerless. No agent would engage in the Internet;
agents are hungry for information, and it’s one of the main reasons they use the Internet.
The Internet is used for communication, as well as for education like Wikipedia. In either
scenario, information can be found at-will, just by a literal “click of a button.” The
simplicity of garnering such information is daunting, but also useful.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, LinkedIn is a useful resource among business
professionals. Now, professionals networking at a business conference can instantly
‘connect’ on LinkedIn, providing an opportunity for a mutually beneficial agentic
relationship. With that said, agents can also search that person’s name on Google. Here,
there is no filtering of search results. Anything and everything the person has been
involved with could appear on Google’s results. This leads us to an interesting division;
on the Internet, there are sites, like Facebook, where agents can regulate what others see.
On other websites, agents completely give up control and privacy. Work histories,
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property and financial deals, family deaths, and even credit scores – if it’s out there, it is
fair game to be found. And, even if an agent ‘disconnects’ from the network and doesn’t
use the Internet, perhaps by disabling their Facebook or Linkedin accounts, the
information still exists. Information is forever fixed in the ‘timeless time’ – or is it?
Ø B. The Right-to-Be-Forgotten
A recent discussion has emerged on whether agents have the ‘right-to-beforgotten.’ That is, information that one does not want to appear on the Internet can be
taken down indefinitely. This case is quite applicable to our study on the complexity of
the Internet, as it brings agents to the forefront of a debate normally centralized around
non-agentic power. Not only does this conundrum bring forth individuals, but also larger
companies like Google.
The poster-boy of the right-to-be-forgotten is Mario Costeja Gonzalez, a Spaniard
who requested an online article to be removed from the Internet. The article was from a
Spanish magazine and recounts a story of an old foreclosure on Mr. Gonzalez’s home
that resulted in a debt he ultimately paid. In a landmark ruling in May of 2014, the
European Court of Justice decided it was not the Spanish newspaper who was responsible
for removing the link, but the data service provider instead: Google. According to the
New York Times, since that ruling, Google has removed more than 250,000 links from its
search results (Rosenthal et al. 2015).
The same story has unfolded for Dan Shefat, a lawyer who has lived in Paris for
30 years. Shefat has been rumored to be involved with the Serbian Mafia, conducting
illicit business practices and other criminal activity. Shefat was also granted his wish by
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the highest European Union Court of Justice, and the links were removed on Google
France’s domain (Ibid).
Still, for people like Mario Costeja Gonzalez and Dan Shefat, there is just one
problem – they’re not totally forgotten, yet. While Google has removed many requested
links, it’s only been in the citizen’s home country. So, a Frenchman who has requested a
link removed from Google has only been removed from Google.fr, and Germans the
same on Google.de. The links still appear on non-European sites, like the American
standard, Google.com.
With the EU’s decision to force Google’s hand, the right-to-be-forgotten is close
to becoming a global reality. European judges and regulators are now heavily pressing
Google to remove links, which they have to review on a case-by-case basis, on all of their
servers – not just European ones. The magnitude of such a change in Internet regulation
could potentially alter the way agents engage and interact with the non-agentic power of
the Internet.
There is a serious precedent that could be set with a global ‘right’ to be forgotten.
The right to forget would completely change the so-called rules of the Internet. No longer
would agents be held accountable for their actions; the potential consequences of an
action would be erased. Information would be skewed; while some individuals could be
easily searchable, others would be ghosts of the Internet, existing fully outside of the
digital world, untraceable to the common man or woman.
Indeed, the precedent could be valuable for some. If Google complies with the
right-to-be-forgotten, it is likely other web monsters, like Facebook, will follow suit.
Although people can already request for content on Facebook to be taken down, the right-
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to-be-forgotten could pose a different policy. Unwanted pictures could disappear from the
web upon a simple request, likely without the photo-owner’s approval. This brings up the
issue of ownership, particularly in the realm of information.
The line is blurry; who owns what information? One agent may request
information to be taken down and ‘forgotten,’ but what if that information is shared
between multiple agents or groups? The right-to-be-forgotten could actually be based on
multiple agent’s rights, thus posing an issue for joint-ownership. Suddenly, individuals
would have freedom and control of information back, a freedom that hasn’t existed since
the dawn of the Internet. The digital age has been frequently attacked for its interference
of personal privacy. Online, agents cannot control what is said, and whom it’s said about.
The right-to-be-forgotten could, potentially, restore this desired privacy back in the hands
of individuals; nevertheless, it comes at a cost of free speech.
While the positives of ‘forgetting’ are numerable, the implications of the right-toforget are considerable from a perspective of non-agentic power. The Internet, as we have
described, is a modern non-agentic power. The collective nature of single agent’s
contributions changes shape constantly, through its nonlinear, cascading chain-reactions
and interconnected communication networks. If agents within complex systems like the
Internet are granted more control, the non-agentic power itself is highly affected.
For example, let’s consider the aspect of intentionality, a defining quality of nonagentic power that we addressed in Chapter 3. Under the conditions of non-agentic
power, agents within the system do not have intentions; moreover, the power itself
assumes an identity without intentions, as the mere size of the power is uncontrollable by
a single agent.
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In a situation of agent-based power, the landscape looks quite different. In the
context of AàB, and A makes B something he otherwise would not have done, A has
power. This, as discussed, is Robert Dahl’s version power. Yet A doesn’t only have
power, he also has intentions. And while the intentions of A may not be realized or
completed, they still exist.
The right-to-be-forgotten brings intentionality back to agents; it completely
interrupts the qualifications of non-agentic power, creating an alternative structure of
Internet power. If agents have the power to take links down as they wish, they can
completely change the shape of the Internet upon demand. While one counterargument
may be that agents had controlling power before the ‘right-to-be-forgotten’ with blogs
and Facebook posts, the difference is significant.
With the introduction of the right-to-be-forgotten, the former situation turns to the
latter; non-agentic power falls back to contain many qualities of an agentic scenario.
Agents certainly have intentions while interacting with the Internet daily; agents can post
and take down information as they please. What makes the right-to-forget different is that
agents can suddenly gain control over information that was never theirs to begin with.
Agent A can write an article about himself and post it on his blog, only to delete it days
later. This is an agentic situation with intentionality. Yet, if agent Q posts an article
online about agent A, the right-to-be-forgotten could allow A to request the article be
down. This gives control, intentions, and power back to A. The entirety of the Internet,
under the conditions of non-agentic power, has been undermined by a single policy. The
power agents have within the situation of the Internet as non-agentic are transposed. And,
the line between privacy and free speech becomes blurred.
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Moreover, the right-to-be-forgotten is linked to the advancement of technology.
The change toward digitizing media over the past decade has been damaging for print
newspapers. In the ‘old’ newspaper world, when the New York Times published a
newspaper and sent millions of copies out into the world, nobody was able to erase that
history. With a hard copy of information, history exists forever, and cannot be forgotten.
If people can erase history with the right-to-be-forgotten, the narrative of the past is
distorted. In this sense, Google becomes a gatekeeper of information, allowing some
information to freely flow, while stopping, concealing, and erasing others.
In a heavily democratized world, agents have become accustomed to online free
speech. Social media has opened a new door for civil liberties, allowing groups and
networks to grow based on the beliefs and opinions of the actors within. But what if
agents can suddenly dictate how free speech is used, and when? Currently, the right-tobe-forgotten is judged on an incident-basis, meaning that Google gets to decide exactly
how a link negatively affects an individual, and why it should be removed. Yet, if the
policy intensifies, the criteria could possibly extend to an uncharted territory; a new outlet
could emerge that allows agents, or groups of agents, argue that links are ‘offensive’
simply by the language and opinions used – thus limiting free speech.
We see with the emergence of policies like the right-to-be-forgotten, a new age of
agentic control within non-agentic power. This re-escalation of agentic power changes
the game of the Internet, allowing more power to agents than ever before. If this happens,
then the Internet could end up returning to the “complex system” stage, where agents
have consciousness and intentions. Maybe agentic power is not as limited as we once
thought.
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IV. Systemic Risk
Ø Computer Viruses
Agentic interconnectivity has increased exponentially with the aid of the Internet.
This non-agentic power certainly has its benefits of communication, efficiency, and
accessibility of information, but there are inherent risks to such complex connections.
The word ‘systemic’ alludes to the power of such interconnectivity; it refers to the risk
level of the system and its potential for failure.
Systemic risk is agent-focused within non-agentic power. In other words, to
assess risk, we study agents or emergent units within non-agentic power. This is
essentially the aim of viewing any complex system, as discussed in Chapter 4. If one
agent or emergent factor falls – the whole system will fail. This is the crux of systemic
risk.
Computer viruses are a prime example of systemic risk within the IoT. There are
a few different types of common viruses that we can categorize as systemic risk, each of
which provide slightly nuanced conclusions on the topic. The first type of virus is a
worm. Worms attack networks, a commonality between all complex systems. From a
non-technical standpoint, worms infiltrate networks and corrupt everything in it; a worm
affects any agent connected in a network. Worms, in contrast to traditional computer
viruses, do not attach to a software program, but instead can stand-alone by impacting
malware. Worms have the ability to copy on its own, often using emails to transport to
new networks. In 2004, the fastest spreading computer worm spread via email; the virus
was a worm called “MyDoom,” also referred to as “W32/MyDoom” or “Novarg.”
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MyDoom infiltrated computers by agents clicking a link or opening an email attachment;
in February of 2004, MyDoom had made its way into one out of every twelve email
messages on the Internet. In Eastern Europe, MyDoom affected a reported 20-22% of all
computers (Murno 2004).
The ability for worms to disguise themselves and penetrate networks is
dangerous; worms are small agents with clear intent to destroy, often harming a much
larger, non-agentic power. With that said, Trojan viruses are even harder to detect than
worms. Trojans, named after the Trojan horse the Greeks got into Troy, are disguised
viruses that sneak into computer systems. Trojans enter the ‘backdoor’ of computer
systems allowing the virus to monitor all keystroke movements, see passwords, banking
information, etc. Notably, Trojan viruses are highly linked to agents; that is, Trojans
cannot do damage without the intent of another agent, such as a hacker. Yet Trojans are
still linked to and affect non-agentic power, as they infiltrate and destroy large networks.
If a Trojan attacks a single agent, his/her communication can be easily monitored, thus
impacting a potential large, non-agentic network that the agent is connected to.
The most common viruses that attack IoT devices are self-replicating, replacing
normal files with corrupt ones. Just like biological viruses attack our healthy cells, a
computer virus turns innocent files to damaged and dangerous ones. Computer viruses,
then, are prime examples of how quickly a harmful substance can spread, potentially
destroying the entire system and every agent involved. One of the worst computer viruses
of all time was named “Melissa,” which reportedly affected over 20% of computers in the
world. The virus was released in 1999 by David L. Smith, who later plead guilty to
creating the virus and was sentenced to ten years in prison. The virus spread through
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email servers, similar to MyDoom, but Melissa was not a standalone worm. The virus
then emailed itself to the first fifty people in the agent’s address book – a truly
unconscious menace that ripped through global communication systems (Crunkish 2008).
Let’s take a step back and think about the relationship between viruses and
systems. Each virus varies in its code and makeup, affecting the IoT in different ways.
Even so, there are countless viruses that exist within systems on a daily basis. A virus can
exist and thrive within the IoT system, but still leave the networks it exists within
unaffected. Admittedly, this depends on the size and power of each virus, but there are
many small viruses that go undetected and are overall harmless. Many viruses become
another part of the system – another emergent piece.
Is there a plausible solution to systemic risk, particularly in the context of viruses
impacting the IoT? While the threat of hacking and viruses has increased, some argue
that data and service providers should be including better security software in their
products. Nobody feels comfortable wearing a t-shirt outside in the snowy winter; rather,
people want to buy warm coats, so they know they won’t get cold or sick. In essence,
products should be made, if possible, with security measures built in.
On the other hand, are we only protecting ourselves against hackers? Or, when an
actor joins a network, are they automatically sacrificing privacy? So maybe, Google is
the real hacker – of our personal information. But, many actors are not aware that their
information is being “stolen” or surveyed. As such, people are scared of their bank
accounts being hacked, but not afraid of their information being sold to companies for
meta-data marketing tools.
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In the end, it seems as though we once again return to the relation between
complexity and systemic risk. As complexes become denser, with more interconnections,
the risk of systemic failure increases. As agents join networks – and visit more websites –
they open themselves up to non-agentic Internet power. Yet agents also become targets of
other agents like worms, Trojans, and regular computer viruses. We see here a unique
blend of agentic and non-agentic power, both of which could pose benefits and potential
risks.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
***
Robert Dahl wrote in 1957 that the concept of power should be perceived in a
simple notation of agents having “power over” one another. The concept of power has
come a long way. The conditions of non-agentic power are not new, but instead have
grown alongside the advancement of a globalized world. The interconnectivity of
technology, trade, education and communication put forth new conceptualizations –
new complexities – new forms of power.
Dahl’s theory may be simple, but the human condition has not always been as
complex as it now appears. In the State of Nature, Dahl’s theory would thrive;
rudimentary human relations are clearly agentic, linear, and calculated. In a simple
relationship of A and B, A’s “power over” B rests on B doing something he otherwise
wouldn’t have done. We have illustrated the impracticality of this theory in the present
day. No longer can we address A’s power over B as self-employed and restricted. No
agent is isolated from the network, and therefore A is connected to X, Y, and Z – each of
which influence the consequences of A’s action. Webs of agents and their relations has
reached unprecedented density, so much that we can no longer categorize power through
agentic relations. Power must be conceptualized in the context of non-agentic power.
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In many scenarios, the question “who has more power?” is irrelevant. It is for this
reason that Bruno Latour suggested (1986, p. 278) that power should be “abandoned” and
why Joseph Naim’s The End of Power (2013) poses the decay of traditional forms of
power, (states, corporations, and political parties) creating opportunities for more
unorthodox types to emerge. No, power should not be abandoned; it is crucial to
understanding the causalities and complexities of global politics. However there are
aspects of agentic power, specifically, that are expendable in today’s system(s). One must
look beyond agents in order to see the intricate globalized world we live in.
But agents are, and forever will be, the focus of power. We cannot abandon
agents themselves, but can instead layer upon existing theories of power. Therefore, it is
essential to recall theorists like Bachrach and Baratz, Stephen Lukes, Michael Foucault,
Joseph Nye and others to see how agents have been traditionally seen as the central actors
in power. And although these theorists are vital in power studies, there is room for
critique.
Dahl uses the example that a layperson cannot control the flow of traffic like a
policeman can. In this depiction, Dahl concludes that the policeman has more power, or
“power over” a layman attempting to stop automobiles in the street. This analysis is true,
and I can’t deny Dahl’s theory of agentic power. What Dahl does not discuss is the actual
traffic. In analyzing the traffic, every actor in the street becomes another important piece
to the puzzle. Every driver affects the volume of traffic; time and location are
deconstructed to make the flow of cars unpredictable. And yet, as anyone who has driven
on a highway knows, there is a collective dynamic to traffic flows in which cars often get
entrapped in large traffic jams, some for no good reason.
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Since Dahl, Weber, and Waltz theorized about power in the 1950’s and 60’s, the
concept has grown with globalization. Bachrach and Baratz introduced a second face of
power with their theory of nondecisions. In such a case, the inaction of actor A could be
due to an influence of B. So, in this illustration, B has some power. Stephen Lukes
extended this idea with his third face of power, where actor B could be doing something
to consciously benefit A. The example we used was an intern (B) getting coffee for their
boss (A). A, then, has real power over B, since B is willingly doing something for A’s
benefit. There is no agent forcing the intern (B) to do anything.
Duvall and Barnett have championed power studies within the field of
international relations, demonstrating that power can shape the mentalities of agents and
states. Duvall and Barnett’s “productive” power focuses on changing mentalities. In the
system of slavery, slaves could believe they are inferior to their masters simply due to the
system and environment. In some places, ‘Westerners’ are treated differently. Why is
this? Perhaps, Duvall and Barnett suggest, it is due to the mentality that the word aerates.
Here we start to drift away from agentic notions of power, now looking at words, ideas,
and potential.
Michael Foucault and Peter Morriss address power with a perspective that begins
to shift from agentic action. Foucault’s theory of discipline indicates that overarching
authorities, like the surveillance state, could shape human behavior. Even social norms,
like politeness, vary across cultures. This holds some weight of power as well.
Power is everywhere, as we are all intertwined in complex networks of relational
power. Yet, if I am A and you are B in a relation of [àAàB]: What are the arrows? We
are agents, but the first arrow is non-agentic. The first arrow is the force that influences
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my action over you, and connects us; the influence could, perhaps, be a consequence of
another agent I have never met. The first arrow could be an action resulting from an idea
I had years ago. There is presence of nonlinearity here; my action over you could be
connected to agents X, Y, or Z that are in different locations and times.
Foucault and Morriss reformed classical standpoints on power by decentralizing
agents in their theories. Even so, they fail to address power in terms of a larger system or
network. We cannot view the world based on simple relationships, but rather intertwined
events. Particularly in the age of technology, where information and communications are
appendages of man, no agent is completely detached from the global system. The
cyclicality of causation is difficult to track; in fact, the cascading consequences lead us to
the fist element of non-agentic power, nonlinearity.
Nonlinearity is an essential characteristic of non-agentic power, separating it from
other theories that exist. We used an example of a boy who comes home to no food for
dinner. This simple fact is a result of a series of events, all of which are connected,
nonlinearly: The boy’s mother was fired from her job, as her she was under pressured to
let employees go after the company’s poor business performance. We see that the
shareholders, who sold stock, are connected to the boy with no food. Although the
stockholder may not be conscious of the effects of his action, he is nonlinearly connected
to the young boy.
This brings us to the next aspect of non-agentic power, intentionality.
Intentionality correlates with predictability. In a simple, agentic situation, actors have
salient intentions. When one person punches another, there are clear intentions; while the
consequences may be unintended, the punch itself was premeditated. There is a clear
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differentiation to be made here. In non-agentic power, there are no intentions. Agents do
not have intentions to undermine a company when selling stock; drivers in a car do not
have the intentions to cause traffic jams, and although many people contribute to it – the
Internet itself does not have intentions or conscious direction. Looking at the Internet also
provides an opportunity to apply the third element of non-agentic power, collectivity.
Looking at power through an agentic perspective is too limited. We have
expressed this. We cannot view an event as AàB, but rather ZàGàTàRàKàAàB,
and so on. Every action is multi-agentic, meaning that actors Z and B above are
connected, nonlinearly, to every other actor in that sequence. And if A punches B, it may
be a result of Z’s initial action. Whether or not A is conscious of this consequence or not
is a different question. Even so, with the addition of many diverse agents, the power of
collectivity starts to take form.
We used a couple examples of collectivity to demonstrate how non-agentic power
is distinguished from other concepts. Emails, for example, are agentic forms of
communication. A can send an email to B, or even a group of agents (listservs). But with
the introduction of social media, online social networks are extensive. Agents lose power
in social media; no longer can an individual act as a “gatekeeper” by deciding whether to
forward an email or not. Therefore, we have seen the rise of “non-agents” in the age of
technology. Agents do not control the spread of information, though they augment its
substance. There is no leader, no hierarchy, and no single location of the Internet. Its
fluidity is difficult to track, and parts of the deep web are nearly inaccessible. All that is
left is a collective mass of agents contributing to the Internet’s extensive reach through
the global system.
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While the majority of our analysis attempts to answer the question, “what is
power?” there is another fundamental contention: Where does power begin? Traditional
theories see power’s source in agentic actions. For example, A has power over B because
he has more guns. Or A has more power than B because he can take his money, or tax
him more. These explanations are once again limited. From a traditional perspective, A
has more power than B because A has intentions to use the guns, (or at least use the threat
of them). But in non-agentic power, there is no intentionality, and many more actors than
just A and B. In today’s world, one cannot simplify relations to A and B and their simple
intentions. Globalization has complicated every relation, transaction, and position of
power.
Power must be viewed through emergence. Emergence attempts break down
large systems to its individual parts. So in assessment of A’s power over B, we can look
at the greater system that A exists within, breaking down every emergent minutia
contributing to its power. Notably, non-agentic power is highly complex, which
complicates reductionism – reducing the whole to its parts. Complexity, in fact, rejects
the sociological practice of reduction, arguing that complex systems simply cannot be
broken down. We use the example that a single person or financial institution cannot be
identified as causing the recession in 2008. Instead, themes and groups of institutions can
be categorized as contributing to the crisis. We can look at collective emergent
properties, which are shared factors within the collective, contributing to non-agentic
power. This helps us identify where power comes from. Power begins with these shared
emergent properties. For example, a social networking ‘group’ that shares similar
ideologies can contribute to the overall direction of the power, and also play a part in its
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demise. Still, the complex power itself cannot be broken down to its absolute minimal
and most individual parts.
Complex systems interconnect agents and increase efficiency. Communication
channels, transportation, and information flows are all expedited as a result of
interconnected complexes. With that said, one emergent factor of complex systems is
fragility. The more agents that join a system, the more fragile it becomes. This positive
feedback mechanism is unavoidable. As a result, complex systems create conditions
where unexpected events happen more frequently. This could, potentially, cause a
“tipping point,” where a systemic risk turns to a systemic failure. These events are
unpredictable, like an extreme power outage across Europe [Figure 4].
Additionally, the study of attractors contributes to emergence and source of
power. Attractors create a centering energy that influences human behavior. We used the
example of Silicon Valley as an attractor, potentially leaving agents on the periphery of
the system (companies consciously choosing not to migrate to the Valley) at a
disadvantage.
We have clearly defined non-agentic power, and contrasted it against established
theories of power. Still, there are overlapping concepts of non-agentic power: complexity,
complex systems, and systemic risk.
There are several reasons to define these terms. First, “non-agentic power” is an
unfamiliar term in power studies. Therefore, we need to parse its differences against the
other, closely related terms. Additionally, the “concept of power” is a broad topic. By
looking at these different terms of complexity, risk and power, we are identifying parts
that make up the body of power. For example, agentic power is one important part of
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power, so we added to it. After spelling out non-agentic power, we go deeper, using case
studies as reinforcement.
Complexity does not abide by specific time or space, and therefore agents are free
to join and leave. We used the example of net neutrality to shed light on this fact. Net
neutrality puts all agents on the same playing field, as it does not introduce time as a
differentiating factor. If net neutrality were terminated, Internet service providers would
profit from companies like Netflix with faster Internet speeds. This challenges the notion
of complexity. Yet, with the FCC upholding net neutrality for now, the Internet looks to
remain complex.
Complex systems are not present in simple, agentic relationships like Dahl talked
about. Instead, complex systems have increased with the rise of technology and nonagentic power. The difference between an ordinary complexity and complex systems are
characterized by the quantity of emergent units. Today, complex systems are displayed in
open source software. Allowing any agent to contribute, the receptivity of new agents
allows the system to exponentially grow. Wikipedia uses open source, creating a sizable
complex system that anyone around the world can contribute to.
We used the right-to-be-forgotten as a case study for non-agentic power,
demonstrating how non-agentic power slightly varies from the other concepts. The rightto-be-forgotten allows people to request removal of links that pertain to them from the
Internet, thus illustrating that agentic actions may not have any consequences at all;
information, also, can simply disappear from right-to-be-forgotten, showing the nonagentic power of the Internet. And finally, we explained the notion of systemic risk, not
through an economic standpoint, but rather using the example of computer viruses.
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Though agentic interconnectivity is beneficial in many ways, the potential for systemic
failure is always looming. The question of when, where, and in how long the system will
fail – that is for another study.
Power is not an equation with an answer. It exists and can be theorized, but it
cannot be physically calculated. There are many layers of theoretical power, which is
why we started by reviewing traditional agentic theories, and moved forward to more
abstract notions of non-agents.
The concept of power is, and always will be unfinished. Scholars have accepted
agentic power as a foundation of the discipline. As the world has globalized, applications
of power have shifted to more conceivable non-agentic situations. Perhaps with future
transformations of global systems, non-agentic power will also become an established
concept of power; but, with one theory put to bed, another will arise.
We are left pondering, in awe of power’s capacity to grow and reshape itself with
no concept of time. How does power evolve? How does the portrait of power change?
Perhaps it is not power changing, but the agents within. Our perceptions transform
alongside the development of our global systems. With more agents and advanced
networks forthcoming, the collective emergent properties of power are only set to change.
It is imperative to respect these transformations with a careful eye, digging deeper into
the heart of interconnectivities, complexities, risk, and most importantly – non-agentic
power.
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